

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MAY, 1975

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# Current History

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### NO ADVERTISING

# Current History

May, 1975

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*How stable are the new states of Africa? What economic and political problems do they face? In this issue, African specialists discuss recent events in the African states in the light of historic and social trends. As our introductory article points out, the Organization of African Unity, established twelve years ago, "produces a consensus usually supported by a majority of its members. Thus the OAU has not failed some part of African expectations."*

## African Unity Twelve Years Later

BY RICHARD E. BISSELL

*Visiting Research Fellow, Center for International Studies, Princeton University*

A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE of the Organization of African Unity is passing almost unnoticed in this country: the organization has survived for twelve years although it is virtually ignored and considered unimportant by foreign policy makers in the United States. There is good reason for placing it low on a list of priorities; nonetheless, the low-level tension between the United States government and the OAU has been amplified in more important forums, like the United Nations. The fact that Americans have chosen to coldshoulder this all-African organization highlights the question of the real condition and the future of the OAU. Not all divorces, after all, occur during the first dozen years of marriage; the long-term effectiveness of the OAU may well be determined by the events of the next few years.

The founding of the Organization of African Unity in May, 1963, was considered an occasion for great rejoicing by many. Poets pictured the new organization as a phoenix arising from the ashes of discredited European colonial empires. Visionaries foresaw the rapid development of a political and economic union covering the entire African continent. Political leaders hoped that they were constructing a grouping capable of bridging the enormous differences among the new African states in terms of ideological orientation, cultural background, and extra-continental political ties. Nearly all were disappointed within a short time.

<sup>1</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Vintage, 1967), describes this diplomacy in full detail.

When they gathered in Addis Ababa in May, 1963, the African states knew what to expect, on the basis of intensive diplomacy by Ethiopian, Guinean, and Liberian diplomats in the previous six months.<sup>1</sup> As anticipated, the Heads of State signed a charter designed to bind together the radical, moderate, and conservative groups of states that had appeared in the few years since independence; to provide for functional cooperation on economic and social affairs; to create a forum for conciliation of conflicts between African states; and to help to liberate those areas of the African continent still governed by European or white-minority governments. In the charter of the new organization, all of these aims were included, in either rhetorical or substantive fashion. What was clear at the Addis Ababa summit conference, however, was the fact that the charter would not provide for the immediate unity of the independent African states. The new states, still jealous of their recently obtained sovereignty and wary of the intentions of those advocating immediate political unity (like the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana), made it clear that any unification would be a long-term process. The organization had no coercive power over the members; subsequently, in early 1964, the African Heads of State declared the current territorial boundaries to be inviolable.

The OAU was not meant to be without functions, however; it was therefore provided with a permanent Secretariat. Admittedly, its early actions were determined by the personnel temporarily on loan from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but few members objected to this. His Imperial Majesty Haile

Selassie was clearly a strong supporter of the new organization, as demonstrated by the elaborate building constructed at Ethiopian expense to house the new organization across the boulevard from the Emperor's Jubilee Palace. The functions of the OAU, however, could only be determined and expanded on the basis of a mandate from all its members, and there were clearly problems among the members as to the proper direction of its growth.

In one important sense, also, the OAU faced a division that it was unable to heal: the divergent interests of Anglophone and Francophone states.<sup>2</sup> While much attention has traditionally been given to the partially successful efforts of the OAU to avoid splits along ideological lines (radical-conservative), from the beginning the OAU has not been able to cement the ties between the Paris-oriented Francophone states of West and Central Africa, and the relatively diverse states with Anglo-American traditions and ties. This division has permeated every aspect of African diplomatic life, with important consequences.

### THE OAU CHARTER

The charter of the OAU outlined activities in virtually all spheres of life, with a relatively small investment in institutions to carry out the charter provisions.<sup>3</sup> The first, and what has remained the foremost, function of the OAU was to provide for regular political consultation, particularly in the semi-annual conferences of the Council of Ministers and in the annual conferences of the Heads of State. One should not underestimate the need for such consultation, on a continent where a telephone call from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to Lagos, Nigeria, must be relayed via Paris and London, and where the diplomatic corps assigned to a country's former metropole is usually larger than all its personnel stationed in other African countries. Normal diplomatic channels were inadequate for a growing quantity of transnational interactions between states that had had virtually no contact under colonial rule. Of equal concern to the African states was their clout in international organizations; their combined 30 to 40 votes in the United Nations General Assembly could be a powerful bloc. The coordination of political views effected by the OAU was instrumental in giving the African bloc the power it wields today.

A second area of interest to the new organization concerned peace keeping, particularly settling border

disputes between states where the colonial authorities had never adequately defined the precise border (Morocco-Algeria, Somalia and its neighbors, and Ghana-Upper Volta). For the purpose of peace keeping, the charter provided for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. The Commission, however, was not activated for several years after the founding of the OAU in 1963 and, indeed, it was generally found that peace keeping proceeded at least as effectively when a dispute was mediated by one Head of State mutually trusted and respected by the two sides.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the OAU has contributed little institutionally to the furtherance of peace in Africa—except for the periodic meetings of ministers and Heads of State, where many differences have been worked out through private consultations.

The OAU charter also expressed wide-ranging goals in the economic and social areas. In this field, however, the organization was slipping into deep water without having learned to swim. The competition—the Organization Commun Africaine et Malgache, the Economic Commission for Africa, and various other U.N. organs—were already experienced in dealing with such problems. Moreover, the specialized commissions established by the OAU for economic and social affairs were unable to recruit the necessary personnel; qualified African experts had already been hired by U.N. agencies with far more funding at their disposal than the OAU could raise. As a result, the OAU commission gradually realized that it should throw operational support to these outside agencies and retain only planning functions. Even the latter have largely atrophied, because the OAU budget has been severely strained.

The last area of intense OAU interest, and the most publicized, has been conflict in the Portuguese territories, in Rhodesia, in Namibia (South-West Africa), and in the Republic of South Africa. There has been rhetorical support for the liberation movements, in the most militant language. Material support, however, has been sporadic. The charter provided for a Committee of Nine, otherwise known as the Liberation Committee, with the responsibility for coordinating aid from the independent African states to the liberation movements recognized by the OAU as legitimate. This committee was funded from two separate sources. Overhead costs, amounting to about \$180,000 in 1970, were met by the regular budget of the OAU. That source of financing was secure, at least until some OAU members questioned the effectiveness of the Liberation Committee. There was, in addition, a special fund that collected assessed donations from OAU members; the fund money was designed to buy arms and supplies for the liberation movements. The annual assessments ranged upward from \$2 million, but in any one year until 1970, the Liberation Committee was unable to collect more

<sup>2</sup> This basic division is fully explained in I. William Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

<sup>3</sup> See Zdenek Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

<sup>4</sup> This fascinating subject is explored by Saadia Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).



than 58 percent and generally collected some 35 to 40 percent of its assessments. What was remarkable about the 1972 conference of Heads of State in Rabat, therefore, was the effort of several states to pay up their arrears (particularly Morocco, whose King Hassan donated \$1 million to the special fund). The interest of OAU members in the liberation movements thus appears to be on the upswing.

## STRUCTURE OF THE OAU

Several organs of the OAU have been mentioned thus far, and a few words might be in order about the constitutional structure of the OAU, as well as its actual operating structure. The highest organ is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which includes the highest political authority of each member state of the OAU. The annual conferences of this group have become largely ceremonial, usually ratifying the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers, and fulfilling other functions not mentioned in the charter. The presense of Heads of State at meetings lends legitimacy or prestige to the OAU;<sup>5</sup> indeed, one useful measure of the fortunes of the OAU has been the attendance at summit conferences, with the nadir at the 1968 Algiers Conference. Head counts have been improving since then, and almost all Heads of State were present at the 1973 summit meeting in Addis Ababa, on the occasion of the OAU's tenth anniversary. Besides adding legitimacy to the organization, the Heads of State conferences have been useful forums for settling bilateral disputes, and initiating new inexperienced heads of state into the African diplomatic environment. Since independence, numerous transfers of power in African states have often resembled musical chairs, with junior colonels obtaining power without any experience in foreign affairs. At the Heads of State conferences, the young leaders join a private but wide-ranging forum to discuss international relations. The increasing maturity of the foreign policies of many African states testifies to the positive influence of the OAU.

The second organ in the OAU hierarchy is the Council of Ministers, which has become the principal organ of political affairs, formulating resolutions and policies to be pursued on a collective or individual basis. This trend can be seen in the planning of the OAU campaign against the white southern African states that was carried to the United Nations Security Council. It was a delegation of the Council of Ministers that spoke before the Security Council in 1963, and, when the meetings were over, the same delega-

tion reported back to the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Dakar in August, 1963. The pattern of activism of the Council of Ministers has not changed.

The last institution of importance is the General Secretariat. After the first year of the OAU's existence (when the provisional secretariat was operated by Ethiopian personnel), the OAU elected Diallo Telli of Guinea as secretary-general. Telli was a colorful personality with a distinctive diplomatic style that often angered those states that preferred a low-profile organization and those states that wanted an efficiently run organization. Telli believed in splashy publicity, and in this he catered to certain Heads of State. He also had an unhealthy disrespect for the bureaucratic mechanisms of an organization. Thus the OAU ceased recording verbatim records of meetings after 1965. The functional commissions found their funding drying up. By the 1970's, Diallo Telli had made many enemies, and he was replaced at the Rabat summit meeting of 1972. He was nearly reelected at that meeting, when Ethiopia's Haile Selassie cavalierly suggested that Telli be kept in office by acclamation. President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire did not agree and in the end the wily maneuvering of President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Cameroons resulted in the election of Nzo Egangaki. The new secretary-general was apparently chosen because he had the qualities Diallo Telli lacked: reserve, deference, and administrative ability. Egangaki lasted in the post only two years, and was replaced in late 1974 by another Cameroonian, William Eteki Mboumoua. The new secretary-general, faced by the worst economic crisis known to the young African states, spelled out the difficulties of his role in an early interview:

I believe that the role of the Secretary General is to be a kind of vector, giving dynamic direction to the conflicting position [of the member states]. He must implement as faithfully as possible what has been resolved by the supreme councils of the Organization.<sup>6</sup>

What plagued his predecessors, of course, was that directions produced by the "supreme councils" were often either contradictory or nonexistent.

## A DIPLOMATIC ROLE

Given the nature of the OAU's institutions and interests, one might reasonably wonder about its role in African diplomacy. The organization has been more important for some states than others: Ethiopia, for instance, has derived much political capital and prestige from her central role in the OAU. On a more continental scale, the OAU has helped to find and to maintain areas of agreement among African states. A balkanized continent like Africa might easily have dissolved in chaos after independence, as the Congo did on a national level, but the OAU served (and still serves) to identify shared goals and

<sup>5</sup> The ramifications of this point are described in Richard Bissell and W. Scott Thompson, "Development of the African Subsystem: Legitimacy and Authority in the OAU," *Polity*, vol. 5, no. 3 (spring, 1973), pp. 335-61.

<sup>6</sup> From an interview in *Africa Report* (November-December, 1974), pp. 9-10.

common enemies. Support for these goals may vary over time. For example, some states moved from confrontation to dialogue with South Africa between 1963 and 1970, and then returned to the fold of the OAU. Certainly the rhetorical power of the OAU was an important factor.

When the OAU attempts to move from the policy-setting plane to the specifics of implementation, it generally fails. That is a result of its diplomatic style. The African states do not take resolutions of the OAU seriously; they rightly realize that these resolutions represent general sentiments, not detailed agreements. The OAU often overstates a situation; thus, in 1972, the Council of Ministers condemned the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for illegal shipments of arms to South Africa. It was generally accepted that only France was actually shipping arms; the other two states were condemned primarily to save the Francophone states some embarrassment. OAU members fail to take its resolutions seriously, too, when the final text is not what they thought they agreed upon. In Diallo Telli's secretariat services, he sometimes changed the wording when he felt the resolution was not strong enough.

Thus one can begin to see why the United States government has shown little patience with the OAU, because of the general inefficiencies of most international organizations, and the careless way political issues are treated. The inefficiencies are legendary. Witness the Liberation Committee's Special Fund; more than half its expenditure in recent years has been for travel, and only a small portion has been spent to provide arms. The treatment of political issues, on the other hand, is more controversial. The United States interprets the OAU's 1972 condemnation of chrome imports into the United States under the Byrd Amendment as irresponsible diplomacy. But other non-African states consider the condemning resolution to be a statement of fact. While other states had the discretion to import Rhodesian goods illegally, we had the temerity, or the honesty, to import openly by act of Congress. This led to condemnation.

It should be remembered, however, that the OAU is a product of African diplomacy. Analyzed in that perspective, the OAU may be considered more democratic than most regional bodies: the Organization of American States largely adheres to the views of the United States, but the OAU produces a consensus usually supported by a majority of its members. Thus the OAU has not failed some part of African expectations.

#### THE U.S. AND THE OAU

The future of the OAU is beyond the wisdom of anyone but a Cassandra or Tiresias. Internal and external factors will destroy the OAU or build a

unified Africa on the OAU as the foundation stone.

What can be prophesied with some certainty is the evolution of attitudes in the United States toward the OAU and vice versa. The United States government is very thin-skinned, and the tiny darts sent in its direction by the OAU are viewed as poison arrows. It can be assumed, however, that Americans will be able to accept criticism with a greater degree of equanimity now that the American investment of political capital has been transferred from Southeast Asia. There will undoubtedly be less paranoia and more realism in the American attitude toward Africa and the OAU.

On the African side, one can only hope for a corresponding move toward realism and what is sometimes called "maturity" in diplomatic style. Many African foreign ministers already regret the tendency of the OAU to dwell on rhetoric instead of action, and it would require only a slight infusion of a new spirit to transform the organization. Change of personnel in the secretariat may be the first stage.

The second stage would be the capture of the initiative in the OAU by states like Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, and the Ivory Coast. But one may wait a long time for such shifts.

The OAU might also demonstrate a capacity for functional activities. The basis for such a movement was laid last year in the attempt to draft a working agreement between the OAU and the United Nations Development Program, in which the OAU would become instrumental in providing technical assistance and other aid to refugee populations, particularly in southern Africa. The first attempt foundered on the provision that transfers of funds remain the responsibility of particular states, and should be subtracted from their national allotments from the UNDP. With subsequent success, however, in dealing with UNESCO and other specialized agencies, the OAU may be able to demonstrate its ability to accomplish tasks of construction. On a longer-term basis, the OAU can work with existing United Nations branches in Africa, like the Economic Commission for Africa, in specific development work. Thus the OAU could earn respectable credentials not only in developed countries, but in those African states who place prime emphasis on the provision of material well-being for their expanding populations.

In a message to the founding meeting of the OAU in May, 1963, United States President John F. Kennedy said: "Africa's continuing march towards independence, unity, and freedom [was] a vital part of

*(Continued on page 229)*

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Richard E. Bissell is the author of several articles on the Organization of African Unity and the forthcoming book on the African states at the United Nations. *South Africa and International Organizations.*

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*"It seems clear that any effort that treats the Sahel food shortage as simply an emergency . . . will only result in a still larger population sharing in current levels of misery. Because the current United States approach defines the food shortage in this way, it will serve only to maintain the problem and, in a quantitative sense, to make it worse."*

## Famine in the Sahel: A Dilemma for United States Aid

BY THOMAS E. DOW, JR.

*Associate Professor of Sociology, State University of N.Y., College at Purchase*

IN THE OPINION of United Nations experts, 32 countries in the world are so short of food and so poor that they are threatened with starvation and bankruptcy. Twenty of the 32 nations are in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>1</sup> Within this group of African nations, the problem is most acute in the Sahel region of West Africa. In this area between the Sahara Desert and the River Niger, the average daily caloric intake per person is significantly below the recommended minimum daily level of 2,300 calories.<sup>2</sup> This shortage is the direct result of a prolonged drought that began in 1968. The drought has been most severe in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta, but it has also touched large areas of the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Kenya. In terms of population, at least one-third of the region's approximately 50 million people have been seriously affected by the drought.

Over the last six years, the Sahel nations and their neighbors have experienced a significant decline in rainfall. Although enormous variations exist within the zone, the experience of the town of Madaoua in Niger suggests the general magnitude of the decline. In Madaoua, 447.9 millimeters of rain fell between June and October of 1969. By 1973, the amount of

rainfall for the same period had declined to 156.4 millimeters.<sup>3</sup> A similar pattern may be observed in the town of Boutilimit, Mauritania, where rainfall between July and September declined from a "normal" level of 200 millimeters to a low of 41 millimeters in 1973. Multiplied hundreds and thousands of times in the villages, hamlets and pastoral areas of the region, this shortfall of rain produced a drought zone 4,000 miles long and 1,000 miles wide. But what produced the prolonged shortfall of rain, the progressive movement of the desert into the Sahel? Apparently, the responsibility must be shared by man and nature.

Considering nature's role first, it has been suggested that the Sahelian drought is not due to a short-term climatic variation, but stems from a basic change in global weather patterns.<sup>4</sup>

If this theory is correct, rainfall late in 1974 was an exception to the long-term pattern of progressive rainfall decline. On the other hand, recent rains may indicate the resumption of "normal" rainfall patterns in the Sahel. Yet even this more optimistic climatic assumption does not affect the region's long-term ecological problems. On the contrary, human actions in good as well as bad weather periods have tended progressively to reduce the long-term carrying capacity of the land, making the occurrence of future droughts more, rather than less, likely.

Given the propositions first advanced by Thomas Malthus (that the increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence; that population invariably increases when the means of subsistence increases; that the actual population is kept equal to the means of subsistence by misery and vice<sup>5</sup>), one can argue that the history of the Sahel is essentially Malthusian. Periods of population increase have regularly been checked by drought, famine, and

<sup>1</sup> Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Upper Volta.

<sup>2</sup> Average daily caloric intake per person is 2110 in Chad, 2060 in Mali, 1940 in Mauritania, 2080 in Niger, and 1710 in Upper Volta.

<sup>3</sup> See Ralph H. Faulkingham *et al.*, "The Demographic Effects of Drought in the West African Sahel," paper presented at the Population Association of America's Annual Meeting in New York, April 20, 1974, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> See Martin Walker, "Drought," in *The New York Times Magazine*, June 9, 1974, pp. 13 and 42.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Malthus, *Essay on the Principle of Population*, 1798.

epidemic disease. This occurred in 1910–1914, 1941–1942, and again, since 1968.<sup>6</sup> When the rains were good, the means of subsistence and the population increased; when the rains failed, population growth was controlled and turned back by “misery,” that is, by famine and pestilence. Yet even in this equilibrium, man’s actions may have subtly shifted the odds further in favor of the desert.

When seven years of good rainfall (1961–1968) enhanced the desert pasture of the Sahel and the crop yields of the sedentary farmers, both the human and animal populations increased. Unfortunately, the animal herds and the population dependent on them increased far beyond the long-term carrying capacity of the land. A failure in rainfall subsequently revealed the overextended nature of the population and accelerated the disintegration of the region’s fragile ecology.

To maintain the human population, it was necessary to maintain the animal herds. Before the drought, this meant cutting down trees to create new pasture; after the drought began, it meant concentrating animal herds at the few remaining reliable sources of water. This concentration exhausted the surrounding pasturage and approximately half the herds of animals died of starvation. Yet this tragedy did not restore an earlier ecological equilibrium. Instead, the desert has expanded and the carrying capacity of the land has been further diminished. Yet most of the people still live. In an ecological sense, the final result of the drought has not yet been realized. The “survivors” remain in jeopardy; the ecological scales have not yet been balanced.

The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse dominate the Sahel. Millions are already familiar with hunger, disease, and strife; and there have been thousands of drought-related deaths. Millions more will die unless significant action is taken. Yet the nations of the Sahel do not have the resources to remedy or to contain their problem; it simply grows along with the population.

### POPULATION GROWTH

The nations of the Sahel and their neighbors (Ethiopia, Kenya, the Central African Republic, and the Sudan) are all growing at a rate of at least two percent per annum; hence they double in population every 35 years or less. This rapid growth (requiring less than half the time needed for population to double in the developed world) is the result of very high fertility and high but declining mortality. Although there are substantial variations within the

region, the pattern for Chad or Mali is not unrepresentative. In Chad, the crude birth and death rates are 48 and 25 per 1,000 respectively; while in Mali, they are 50 and 27. Subtracting the crude death rates from the crude birth rates, one obtains an annual rate of natural increase of 23 per 1,000 or 2.3 percent.

While this rate of population increase would appear to be an obstacle to agricultural self-sufficiency and general socioeconomic development, this association is not recognized by the Sahelian nations. At the 1974 World Population Conference at Bucharest, for example, the delegate from Mali rejected any Malthusian approach to population, and indicated that for the moment Mali “preferred to keep her rate of population growth.”<sup>7</sup> Similarly, Niger and Chad rejected reductions in their population growth rates on the grounds that they had “virgin lands to be developed” and “needed strong hands to build the nation.”<sup>8</sup> Thus both nations sought international assistance in order to modernize their economies.

In keeping with their positions, the Sahelian nations do not have a policy to reduce population growth rates nor do they support family planning programs for any reason. It remains to be seen whether nations that cannot feed themselves and are too poor to compete in the marketplace for food, fertilizer, and petroleum can afford the luxury of unchecked population growth. At this moment, the Sahel confronts the developed world with its need for food and its more general desire to obtain economic assistance in order to modernize. The Sahelian countries apparently assume that such support will allow their rate of economic growth to exceed their rate of population growth. It must also be assumed that in the long run, genuine reductions in fertility might follow from a general improvement in the standard of living.

How then are the rich nations in general and the United States in particular to respond to the needs of the Sahel? What should we do and what have we done?

### TRIAGE

Given the enormous problems of the Sahel—its extreme poverty, its rapid population growth, its limited agricultural capacity, its rudimentary economic infrastructure, its social and political instability—one might conclude that no help should be given; that no further food should be sent. This conclusion follows from the application of the principle that food should be sent only to those nations that will become self-sufficient as a result of temporary food transfers. Nations strong enough to recover without food transfers and those so weak that they will perish in spite of them are to be left to their own fate. This concept, known as triage, is adapted from the

<sup>6</sup> Faulkingham, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Reported in the journal *People*, vol. 1, no. 5 (1974), p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.



## DROUGHT IN THE SAHEL



*Source:* Department of State Publication 8792,  
African Series 58, October, 1974.

French medical practice of World War I. The hungry or "wounded" nations of the world, according to this view, should be sorted into three groups:

- (1) Those so seriously wounded they cannot survive regardless of the treatment given them;
- (2) Those who can survive without treatment regardless of the pain they may be suffering;
- (3) Those who can be saved by immediate medical care.<sup>9</sup>

Following this concept, some experts would place the nations of the Sahel in category one. Further transfers of American food to this region would be opposed because such food would not help the terminally ill nations but would deprive less sick nations of the food necessary for their own recovery. In other words, food transfers to category one nations only multiply the number of "ill" or hungry people without enhancing prospects for their recovery. Moreover, in the long run, even this increasing misery could not be supported, and many more would die as a result of our help than would have died in its absence. Indeed, some believe we ourselves might be among the victims.

#### LIFEBOAT ETHICS

Garrett Hardin argues that the real question is not with whom we should share our food but whether it is in our interest to share it with anyone. To help answer this question, he suggests that the United States (and other developed nations) may be seen metaphorically as a lifeboat full of comparatively rich people.

In the ocean outside [the] lifeboat swim the poor [and hungry] of the world, who would like to get in, or at least to share some of the wealth. What should the lifeboat passengers do?<sup>10</sup>

If we accept Hardin's assumption that the capacity of the lifeboat (the food and wealth of the United States) is adequate only to meet the needs of its passengers, and to provide them with a necessary safety factor against the consequences of adverse weather or crop disease, we must conclude with him that our survival requires us to admit "no more to the lifeboat."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The word *triage* comes from the French verb *trier*, to sort. See William and Paul Paddock, *Famine—1975!* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 206.

<sup>10</sup> Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," *Psychology Today*, vol. 8, no. 4 (September, 1974), p. 40.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>12</sup> Roger Reville, "The Ghost at the Feast," *Science*, vol. 186, no. 4164 (November 15, 1974), p. 589.

<sup>13</sup> Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>14</sup> The bulk of the United States contribution (\$37 million out of \$42 million) was in the form of cereal grain. Of the 620,000 tons of food grains provided by all donors through 1973, the United States contributed 256,000 tons and the E.E.C., France, Canada, Germany, China, and Russia contributed the rest.

#### I AM MY BROTHER'S KEEPER: AN ETHIC OF GOOD INTENTIONS

Of course, neither the assumptions of the "lifeboat" nor those of "triage" are universally accepted. In opposition to these positions, most experts stress (1) that people will voluntarily reduce fertility "when they have good reasons and the knowledge and means to do so";<sup>12</sup> (2) that scientific advances will expand the limits of our environment to accommodate present population increases; and (3) that the savings realized from major reductions in food and energy consumption in the rich nations will be available for transfer to the hungry nations.

In essence, opponents of the triage and lifeboat philosophies are saying that we must continue and increase food transfers; we must also provide massive economic assistance to promote agricultural self-sufficiency and lower population growth rates. But what of the sacrifice implicit in this colossal effort? If the sacrifice required of us is defined solely by the needs of others, then it has no limit, or at least no limit that we can control. To the degree that we recognize agricultural self-sufficiency or even merely adequate nutrition as a universal human right, we seem to impose on ourselves the obligation to "provide effective help regardless of cost."<sup>13</sup> Such an unconditional obligation or purpose may best be characterized as an ethic of good intentions. Unfortunately, such an ethic, however noble its ultimate end, is basically irresponsible in terms of its indifference to the consequences within our own society. Obviously, we cannot accept an open-ended obligation that might eventually reduce us to the state of those who seek our help. And yet we cannot ignore the needs of the Sahel's hungry nations. What then is to be done?

#### UNITED STATES ACTION IN THE SAHEL

In the United States response to the Sahelian problem, both the do "nothing" and the do "everything" positions have been rejected. The United States has joined with other developed nations in a massive food transfer effort, instead of abandoning the Sahel to its Malthusian fate and allowing famine to reduce population size to the current carrying capacity of the land. By providing approximately one-third of the international relief effort through 1973 (\$42 million out of \$135 million)<sup>14</sup> and an apparently similar proportion in 1974, the United States helped to provide at least a minimum diet for most of the afflicted population. Thus we helped to keep alive most of the people in the region, and we seem committed to similar assistance in the immediate future. But whether we are willing or able to sustain and enhance the lives we have saved is another matter.

In this particular case, it would appear that we can

afford to give more aid with only modest reductions in our standard of living or way of life. For example, yearly meat consumption in the United States has gone up from 55 pounds per capita in 1940 to nearly 120 pounds today. Recognizing that it takes roughly 7 pounds of grain to produce one pound of beef and 4 to 5 pounds of grain to produce a pound of pork, a 10 percent reduction in our meat consumption would produce a significant surplus in grain that might be shared with the hungry nations. Obviously, a greater reduction in meat consumption would generate a proportionately larger grain saving, but would probably be unacceptable to most Americans.

### PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

If we consider the prospects for an expansion of food, and particularly grain, production, we see that most arable land in the United States and the rest of the world is already under cultivation. On the other hand, yields per acre might continue to be increased very substantially in the developed and the developing countries. On the basis of these anticipated increases, the United States Department of Agriculture believes that global production can keep up with consumption at least through the next few decades. The department warns, however, that if current population growth trends continue, "we may enter a situation where agricultural solutions are not possible."<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, significant reductions in population growth in regions like the Sahel seem unlikely to occur in the absence of some major improvement in the standard of living: "It is not until there is a general improvement in the way of life through improved diets, health, education, and employment of the bottom two-thirds of the population that they have the motivation for smaller families."<sup>16</sup> Such an improvement is itself contingent on much greater assistance from the developed nations in general and from the United States in particular.

Thus the problem in the Sahel and other food deficient regions is both short term, in relation to the minimum diet necessary for survival, and long term, in relation to the eventual achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency and population stabilization. Given these short- and long-term problems, and their respective price tags, the United States will probably avoid both the emotional burden of doing "nothing" and the economic burden of doing "everything."

<sup>15</sup> From a statement by Andrew J. Mair, Department of Agriculture, to the House Subcommittee on Africa, July 31, 1973.

<sup>16</sup> From a statement by James P. Grant, president, Overseas Development Council, to the House Subcommittee on Africa, July 31, 1973.

<sup>17</sup> This was the view taken by Maurice Williams, the President's Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief to sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>18</sup> Reville, *op. cit.*, p. 589.

This position of restrained concern was clearly evident at the recent World Food Conference in Rome, where the United States showed great reluctance to accept primary responsibility for meeting present and future world food shortages. Such responsibility, incidentally, was implicit in the attempt of a majority of the participants to establish a World Food Bank, to which the United States would be the principal depositor and from which other nations would make withdrawals to meet their food deficits.

### A LONG-TERM SOLUTION?

Finally, without knowing the level of future United States assistance to the Sahel, one cannot know whether these efforts will eventually solve the problem, or simply maintain the problem, or even make the problem worse. It seems clear that any effort that treats the Sahel food shortage as simply an emergency—as a single and unique natural disaster to which the United States responds in the light of its humanitarian tradition<sup>17</sup>—will only result in a still larger population sharing in current levels of misery. Because the current United States approach defines the food shortage in this way, it will serve only to maintain the problem and, in a quantitative sense, to make it worse.

On the other hand, a greater effort, aimed at creating the socioeconomic and demographic conditions necessary for agricultural self-sufficiency, might work toward the long-term solution of the problem. But that greater effort would require sacrifices that are unlikely to be made in any case and are certainly unlikely in the absence of greater control over the terms of assistance. If more aid is to be given by the United States, if greater sacrifices are required to absorb the greater costs of food transfers and non-agricultural foreign assistance, then more must be asked of those to whom it is given. If there is a moral obligation to do more, there may be a corresponding obligation to ask more. As Roger Reville suggests:

rich nations would be morally justified in insisting that the major part of [food,] capital and technical assistance be directed toward improving the living conditions . . . of poor people, through bringing about higher levels of literacy and employment . . . , improved health . . . , agricultural modernization . . . , and family planning services that give poor families freedom to choose the numbers of their children.<sup>18</sup> ■

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Thomas E. Dow, Jr., has contributed numerous articles on population to *Current History*. He has worked extensively in the field in Africa, and is going to spend the academic year 1975–1976 as Visiting Fellow in Demography at the Australian National University in Canberra.

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*"Domestic differences within the East African Community have inhibited the international cooperation among its members necessary for its success."*

## Diverging Paths in East Africa

BY JAY E. HAKES

*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of New Orleans*

IN 1964, the political union of the East African states of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda was widely regarded as a strong possibility. Today, plans for increasing regional integration are only a dim memory. Economic ties continue through the operations of the East African Community (EAC), but cooperation even at this level has been badly damaged by recent events.

East African cooperation has proved more difficult than anticipated, because the individual states have diverged greatly in their political and economic policies, despite their geographic proximity and similar histories. Kenya and Tanzania represent competing approaches to social and economic change in Africa, while the despotic rule of General Idi Amin in Uganda sets Uganda apart not only from her East African neighbors, still under civilian rule, but from virtually all the states of Africa.

Differences within the Community have been aggravated by a series of international incidents, especially along the Ugandan-Tanzanian border, where General Amin has threatened to invade several times since he came to power in 1971. Other bilateral relations are not as unfriendly, but in every case relations have deteriorated since the mid-1960's, and the EAC is a likely casualty.

Kenya and Tanzania have adopted almost polar positions toward development. Stated briefly, the Kenyan approach to development (as presented in the government's 1965 booklet, *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*) places emphasis on economic growth, with equality in the distribution of economic resources serving as only a subsidiary goal. Tanzania's philosophy has been articulated in many speeches of President Julius Nyerere and various pronouncements of the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

<sup>1</sup> For a comparison of educational systems in Kenya and Tanzania, see Edmund O'Connor, "Contrasts in Educational Development in Kenya and Tanzania," *African Affairs*, vol. 75 (January, 1974), pp. 67-84.

calls for the creation of a "classless society" based on the traditional communal and family values of the African village; growth is regarded primarily as a way to achieve equality.

Despite claims to the contrary, the economic policies of President Jomo Kenyatta's government in Kenya are hardly socialist, as least as the term is normally understood. Rather, Kenyatta's policies are a mixture of private capitalism, state capitalism, the welfare state, and incentives for individual ownership. Kenya became independent with more economic advantages than her neighbors, and she has decided to invest in areas where she is already strong rather than concentrate on the poorest areas.

Thus, since independence, Kenya has achieved impressive rates of growth. In real dollars, the gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at an annual rate of about 6.5 percent, about double the rate of population growth. During the same period, the government has greatly expanded its services in the fields of education, medicine, and job training. Primary school enrollment grew from 1,014,800 in 1964 to 1,675,919 in 1972—an increase of 65 percent, while secondary school enrollment went from 35,921 to 161,900—a jump of 351 percent.<sup>1</sup> Much of the growth in education occurred because of local initiatives in establishing unaided *harambee* schools.

Within Kenya, however, there has been considerable grumbling about the distribution of the country's wealth and persistent rumors about corruption on the part of government leaders. Economic growth has accentuated the visible differences between the small number of rich people and the poor, although economic stratification is not so clearly related to race as it was during the period of colonial rule, because of Kenya's Africanization program. Africans can take advantage of opportunities in business and large-scale farming, but only a few, often politicians, are able to do so.

It is hard to weigh popular discontent about economic distribution, but one indicator may be the po-



popularity of politicians like Assistant Ministers Martin Shikuku and J. M. Kariuki,\* and KANU backbencher M. J. Seroney, who are strong critics of the Kenyatta government (though not necessarily of Kenyatta himself). In the 1969 and 1974 national elections, most incumbents were defeated, but Shikuku, Kariuki, and Seroney won reelection by comfortable margins. These critics of the government are frequently barred by the government from giving public addresses. Moreover, Oginga Odinga, who was leader of the opposition Kenya People's Union (KPU) until its dissolution and his detention in October, 1969, was not allowed to run in the 1974 elections, although he had rejoined KANU shortly after his release from detention in March, 1971. These measures seem to reflect the government's fear of popular dissatisfaction with its economic policies.<sup>2</sup>

Recently, the problems of distribution have received greater attention outside Kenya because of the publication in 1972 of a report by a study mission from the International Labor Office entitled *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*. The 600-page document contains a cautious and elaborate analysis of the Kenyan economy. While the report acknowledges the success of Kenya's strategy of growth and its Africanization program, it also identifies serious difficulties in the economy, particularly in the areas of unemployment and unequal distribution of resources. The ILO report states that independence:

has intensified rather than relieved a number of difficulties inherited from the colonial era. Many of these difficulties are variations of different forms of imbalance and inequality—between town and country, different regions, large and small landholders, those with education and those without.<sup>3</sup>

The report concludes that, in many respects, economic growth is continuing along lines set during the colonial period.

According to the ILO mission, the government's failures included (1) not establishing a progressive system of taxation to redistribute incomes; (2) not

encouraging more growth in employment, which has lagged behind the growth in population; and (3) concentrating development in the area of Nairobi. The latter issue demonstrates the severity of the distribution problem. At the time of the report, Nairobi, with five percent of the nation's population, generated more than half the national output in manufacturing, electricity and commerce, two-fifths in transportation and services, and two-thirds in construction.<sup>4</sup>

The ILO report suggested a number of general and specific measures to deal with these problems, including (1) temporarily stabilizing the real incomes of the receivers of the top 10 percent of the total income; (2) establishing quotas for expenditure per head in different sections of the country for certain vital services like education, health, and roads; (3) considering a ban on the import of luxury cars; and (4) discouraging unnecessary mechanization of trade, banking, and personal services.

The weaknesses of the Kenyan economy are magnified when contrasted with the socialist ideology of Tanzania. President Nyerere argues that socialism is based on the traditional African extended family (*ujamaa* in Swahili). In concrete terms, Tanzanian ideology calls for collective ownership of land and the means of production, decentralization of political authority, concentration of development in the poorest areas, and economic sacrifice on the part of political leaders. Despite Tanzania's poverty and relatively slow rate of economic growth, President Nyerere's concept of socialism has proved attractive to intellectuals both in and out of Africa.

An increasing concern in Tanzania in recent years has been whether economic and political practice can be made to conform to socialist theory. Since more than 95 percent of Tanzania's population lives in rural areas, the aspect of Tanzanian socialism that affects the most people is the movement toward *ujamaa* villages. In *ujamaa* settlements, land is owned collectively, and production and distribution are carried on by means of cooperatives. From the inception of the policy in 1967 until 1973, the *ujamaa* movement was voluntary, and only about one million out of ten million peasants joined such villages. In 1973, however, a TANU biennial conference decided that all peasants had to join *ujamaa* villages and set 1976 as the target date. Forced collectivization will face stiff opposition, particularly in areas like Bukoba and the slopes of Kilimanjaro, where some farmers have a considerable stake in private landholdings. The new *ujamaa* village policy will probably provide a good indication of the level of coercion that will be needed to implement Tanzanian ideology.

TANU is also moving to insure stricter adherence to its guidelines for political leaders. In 1967, TANU adopted its leadership code, which declared that party

\* In early March, 1975, Kariuki was killed by an unknown assassin.

<sup>2</sup> Two recent books have analyzed the relationship between development and mass politics: Henry Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

<sup>3</sup> International Labor Office, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1972), p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> For an analysis of the impact of Kenyan policies on equality, see Jay E. Hakes and George V. Silbernagel III, "Tensions in Development: The Politics of Distribution in Kenya," a paper presented to the 16th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, February 19–22, 1975, Washington, D.C.

and government officials could not own rental property, own shares in companies, serve on company boards, or earn more than one salary. Among other means, these rules could be circumvented by ownership by family members. In 1973, a Committee for Enforcement of the Leadership Code was established with powers to investigate violations of the code and punish offenders. In 1974, TANU adopted a membership code, which extended the provisions of the leadership code to all members of TANU.

In 1973, TANU also demonstrated its commitment to developing poor areas, when it decided to move the national capital from the coastal city of Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in central Tanzania, at an estimated cost of over half a million dollars. Although the transfer is scheduled to take ten years, the national assembly began meeting in Dodoma on October 22, 1974.

Despite Tanzania's push toward socialism, the differences between Kenya and Tanzania are sometimes exaggerated, for they retain many common elements. Both countries are one-party states, and the names of the ruling parties are even patterned after each other, although one-party rule is established by law in Tanzania, while Kenya bans opposition parties on an *ad hoc* basis. Both states use primary elections to allow voters to exercise some choice among candidates for the national assemblies. Despite some differences in the way these elections are run, voters in both states have tended to favor new faces over incumbents.

Tanzania is scheduled to hold her third national election since independence this year, and Kenya completed her second country-wide polling in October, 1974. Last year's election in Kenya demonstrated some of the problems of incumbency. Of the 159 sitting constituency members, 88 lost their seats, including 4 out of 20 ministers and 13 out of 38 assistant ministers.

Such democratic purges of parliamentarians have had little perceptible impact on government policies in either Tanzania or Kenya. Especially in Kenya, membership in the Cabinet has remained relatively stable. Voters generally have returned Cabinet members at election time in order to retain the influence of their areas in government, and both Nyerere and, more particularly, Kenyatta have hesitated to remove ministers from office. Moreover, members of Parliament who are not in the government exert little influence on policy, although Kenyan backbenchers are probably the most outspoken in Africa. Members of Parliament in Kenya and Tanzania have attempted to change government policies on several occasions, but with virtually no direct success. On November 27, 1973, for instance, the Tanzanian Na-

tional Assembly rejected by a vote of 66 to 46 the Income Tax Bill of 1973, which established Tanzania's national income tax system after the dissolution of the East African Income Tax Department. After Nyerere strongly condemned the actions of "an entrenched minority," the bill passed unanimously on December 13 with only minor amendments.

Even in the field of political and social reform, Kenya and Tanzania resemble each other more than is commonly recognized. Many aspects of Tanzania's leadership code were adopted in Kenya shortly after Tanzania's action. This code has been largely unknown even in Kenya, where it has received only minimal publicity, perhaps because the government does not want to answer questions about political leaders who somehow have accumulated considerable wealth. Similarly, Kenya has haltingly followed Tanzania's lead in making Swahili the national language. The use of Swahili gives the common people an increased access to government and decreases the dominance of the English-speaking elite. Although Kenya has a long way to go before Swahili is firmly entrenched as the national language, the National Assembly did begin to conduct its business in Swahili in June, 1974. Previously, Kenyan members had been required not only to debate in English, but also to pass a test in English before running for office.

Uganda cannot be classified in the same ideological terms as Kenya and Tanzania. Since General Idi Amin came to power by a military coup against Milton Obote in January, 1971, the country has been characterized by one-man rule, and its policies have erratically shifted.

The Western press has carried numerous stories about Amin's buffoonery, but these incidents should not obscure the fact that Amin and the army have established a reign of terror in Uganda. A large number of Uganda's prominent citizens—including jurists, intellectuals, professionals, and political leaders—are missing or dead; many others have chosen exile over the risks of remaining in the country. Early in 1973, the International Commission of Jurists condemned the lawlessness and brutality of the Ugandan armed forces that had led to mass murder.

The fate of Amin's three foreign ministers illustrates the precarious nature of political leadership in Uganda. Amin's first foreign minister was Wanume Kibedi, whose sister was Amin's wife. When he was in Nairobi in February, 1973, delivering a message from General Amin to President Kenyatta, Kibedi suddenly disappeared. Shortly thereafter, he sent his resignation to Amin by mail and went into exile. Later, he condemned Amin's "extensive liquidation of innocent Ugandans," saying that "Amin has made repression and brutality cornerstones of his power structure."<sup>5</sup> For his part, Amin at one point accused Kibedi of planning to lead an invasion of Uganda.

<sup>5</sup> Wanume Kibedi, "Kibedi Speaks Out," *Africa Report*, vol. 20 (July-August 1974), pp. 45-48.

In October, during a partial shuffle of the Cabinet, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ondoga, formerly ambassador to Moscow, was appointed to replace Kibedi as foreign minister. Ondoga, however, was quickly dismissed, and his dead body was found in the Nile River. On February 19, 1974, Elizabeth Bagaya, formerly ambassador to Egypt, became the third foreign minister within a year. Bagaya was the princess of the traditional kingdom of Toro and the first woman to serve in the Uganda Cabinet. However, on November 28, Amin dropped her as foreign minister and accused her of making love to a European in a toilet at the Paris airport, communicating with the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence, and failing to account for Shs. 160,000 of Ugandan funds. The portfolio for foreign affairs was then retained by Amin himself.

In all, since Amin came to power, thousands of people have been murdered in Uganda, including Basil Bataringaya, one of more than ten former ministers killed; Chief Justice Benedicto Kiwanuka; Frank Kalimuzo, vice-chancellor of Makerere University; Joseph Mubiru, former governor of the Bank of Uganda; and Colonel Charles Arube, chief of staff of the armed forces.

Given the problems of mere survival in Uganda, it is not surprising that economic planning receives less emphasis there than in Kenya or Tanzania. Growth rates are low in Uganda and annoying shortages of commodities and trained personnel have developed in several areas. Amin precipitated many of the problems in late 1972 when he expelled 50,000 Asians, including many businessmen and professionals, from the country on 90 days' notice. Many smaller businesses were turned over to the military and their relatives, while large corporations were transferred to the Uganda Development Corporation. Shortly thereafter, Amin nationalized 36 British-owned businesses and tea estates. His actions took place with little forethought or planning and dealt a serious blow to the economy, although they did have some populist appeal among the African population.

Amin will undoubtedly continue to face opposition. Two serious attempts have already been made to overthrow him—an invasion of guerrillas supporting Obote from Tanzania in 1972 and an army coup in 1973—but they were quickly put down. Amin has continued to narrow the ethnic base of the armed forces to insure their loyalty.

#### RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

Domestic differences within the East African Community have inhibited the international cooperation among its members necessary for its success. The EAC continues, because it meets the economic needs of the individual states. Tanzania gains East African Airways' service to remote areas of the country; land-

locked Uganda benefits particularly from the operation of the East African rail system that links her with the coast; Kenya with her dominant position in trade and commerce has taken advantage of the Community's modified free trade provisions. However, it is questionable whether the economic rationale for economic integration can overcome the present obstacles to it.

Relations between Tanzania and Uganda have remained very strained since Amin came to power. After Amin's coup, Tanzania granted asylum to former President Milton Obote, and many of Obote's supporters began to use Tanzania as a base of operation. Obote's asylum has been the major impetus to several threats by Amin to invade Tanzania. The Mogadishu Agreement of 1972, mediated by Somalia, repaired relations somewhat, but in July, August and December, 1974, Amin renewed his threat to invade. Before 1971, the heads of the East African states, who constitute the East African Authority, could work out major problems within the community. At present, however, Amin and Nyerere refuse to meet with one another.

Although tension between Uganda and Tanzania remains the most difficult problem confronting the EAC, events of December, 1974, demonstrated that nationalism has also undermined cooperation between Kenya and Tanzania. Early in December, Tanzania closed roads in northern Tanzania to heavy trucks from Kenya during a period of repairs. The ban disrupted trade between Kenya and Zambia, although consultations were held to select alternative routes, after an exchange of charges. Later in the month, the Kenyan government announced that it would begin expelling Tanzanian workers from the country in retaliation for alleged Tanzanian actions against Kenyan workers. On December 19, Kenya expelled an official of the East African Harbors Corporation from Mombasa on a few hours' notice, following the expulsion of a Kenya official of the Corporation from Dar es Salaam the previous week. As strongly worded statements were issued on both sides, further steps were taken to cut normal road, rail, and steamer traffic between the two nations. Since Kenya and Uganda have also encountered recent mutual problems, the relations among all members of the Community are at best difficult.

In any case, Tanzania's focus has been shifting  
(Continued on page 230)

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Jay E. Hakes is author of *A Study Guide for Kenya* (Boston: African Studies Center, Boston University, 1969). He has previously contributed articles on African politics to *Current History*, the Sage monograph series on comparative legislatures, and *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1972)



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*"The new civilian and military forces in Ethiopia have an opportunity to lay the foundations of a more democratic and less friable regime."*

## Revolution and Change in Ethiopia

By W. A. E. SKURNIK

*Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado*

**F**ORCES SET IN MOTION by the French and American revolutions are still challenging rule by divine right and substituting peoples as the basis for legitimate government. In 1974, these revolutionary forces moved into Ethiopia and liquidated the old empire. The end of the ancien regime was punctuated by profound convulsions, which the armed forces did their best to contain.

The military takeover in Ethiopia was gradual, stretching from February to September, 1974. It may be understood by distinguishing four phases.<sup>1</sup> The first phase lasted from February to the end of April. It was characterized by strikes in the civilian sector in Addis Ababa, mutinies in the armed forces, an accent on economic grievances, growing demands for fundamental political reforms, experimentation with a number of long-sought freedoms, and a major blow to the prestige of the system and the Emperor. After substantial pay increases, the armed forces tended to remain in the background but flexed their muscles by eroding government authority.

The unrest that led directly to the mutinies in the armed forces reflected the hardships of inflation and the aftermath of drought and famine. Although the Sahel region received most of the publicity about famine in black Africa, Ethiopia, particularly the northern provinces of Wallo and Tigre, suffered at least as much from the consequences of several years of drought. Famine in Ethiopia is not uncommon. What set 1973 apart was widespread public discussion of apparent government ineptitude. Much like other African governments that suppressed news of famine and epidemics because of national pride, the Ethiopian government concealed early warning signals and international reports that about 200,000 people had died of famine. Student and peasant protests were repressed. To make matters worse, Ethiopia was ex-

porting grains. Although the grains were not part of the people's normal diet, this action was nonetheless criticized as a high water mark of government insensitivity.

Popular unrest began in Addis Ababa in the middle of February, 1974, with a teacher wildcat strike. Teachers reacted to reforms that they perceived as a threat to their corporate interests. They struck and asked for higher wages, and were joined by students and by cab drivers protesting the high cost of fuel and inflation. The armed forces remained passive, and the demonstrations were stopped by the police. At the end of February, however, troops in the Eritrean capital of Asmara, later joined by junior officers, demanded a steep pay increase and took senior officers into custody. They were joined by troops in Addis, naval units in the port of Massawa, and the Third Division in Harrar to the east of Addis.<sup>2</sup> Faced with the prospect of losing control of the armed forces, the government quickly announced a military pay increase; but it was rejected in Asmara as insufficient.

The rejection signaled the entry of the armed forces into the political process. The government of Premier Aklilu Hobte Wold was forced to resign and was replaced by a new team headed by Endalkatchew Makonnen, an aristocrat with some liberal tendencies, who was more acceptable to the military. Fresh claimants soon pressed for new economic demands. The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions, for instance, emboldened by the success of the armed forces, called for a general strike to underline its own desires for wage increases and for the right to strike. Priests of the national orthodox church threatened a walkout unless they received higher pay and fringe benefits. Students went on strike and demonstrated in the streets of Addis. Faced with these pressures, the new government temporized and made concessions. It authorized a total annual pay increase of over \$75 million (\$50 million for labor, \$25 million for the armed forces, and \$2.5 million for teachers). These concessions affected only a privileged minority, about 2 million of the country's 28

<sup>1</sup> This interpretative scheme is an adaptation of a scheme suggested by David B. Ottaway in the *Washington Post*, September 8, 1974.

<sup>2</sup> A January 14, 1974, mutiny in an army unit at Negele south of Addis was apparently quashed, but indicated unrest in the armed forces.



million people. Nothing was said about the source of these additional outlays, especially in view of the country's skyrocketing expenditures for energy imports and its low tax base.

The new government also made a number of more basic concessions that heralded the onset of a new political system. Most far-reaching was a constitutional revision to create an executive responsible not to the throne but to a popularly elected legislature. The reform, announced by the Emperor, seemed of lesser moment than experiments with a free press and freedom of assembly and talk about a political party as well as about the most serious economic issue, land reform. Most significant, for the first time the Emperor yielded to pressure publicly; the symbol of the imperial government was beginning to tarnish. In an unprecedented move, Emperor Haile Selassie appointed one of his grandsons, Zara Yakob Asfa Wossen, as "acting crown prince."

The second phase, which lasted until the end of June, witnessed a power struggle between the government, which attempted to reassert its control, and the armed forces, which became increasingly restive. Effective power was shared among the government, the Emperor, and the armed forces, which retained a veto over much government action. The new government replaced key civilian and military officials with loyalists, and arrested many presumed army activists and their sympathizers. This in turn exacerbated the ongoing struggle inside the armed forces.

At the same time, civilian unrest spread, some 30,000 Muslims demonstrated peacefully in Addis, asking for an end to religious discrimination and the right to participate equally in public life in a secular state. There were also disturbances in the countryside, apparently encouraged by students and by elements of the armed forces.

The armed forces were beset by internal strife and continued uneasiness. The third division, based in Ogaden province, long hesitant before joining the "rebellion," pressured the Emperor into dismissing the deputy chief of the armed forces staff. Frictions developed at the Debra Zeit air base, where paratroops prevented an outright mutiny, as well as within the imperial bodyguard, which had divided loyalties. Led by enlisted men and some junior officers, the mutineers continued to consolidate their hold on the armed forces, with the help of committees that tended to replace the orthodox military hierarchy. Because of their concern for avoiding a civil war and a direct confrontation with senior officers and the Emperor, the mutineers repeatedly proclaimed their loyalty to the monarch. But they also began to arrest leading military and civilian officials and publicly announced their dismay at the government's tactics in delaying political reforms.

The third phase, during which the armed forces

controlled the government in all but name, began at the end of June, 1974, and lasted until September. Apparently stung by a National Assembly delegation asking for the release from army detention of former government officials, the armed forces reacted swiftly. They occupied strategic locations in Addis and began a wave of arrests to further weaken the authority of government and Emperor; they dissolved the National Security Committee, which they saw as an arm of government repression; and they pressed for the replacement of the Premier by Michael Imru. Imru, a patrician champion of liberal causes, had previously been exiled to foreign diplomatic posts.

Progressive elements in the armed forces continued their campaign to bend the government. They asked publicly for the release of imprisoned junior and non-commissioned officials, publicized growing sentiment for a direct army takeover, used the media to attack the institution of monarchy (and later the Emperor himself), arrested select military and government leaders close to the Emperor to weed out his inner circle of advisers, and made public the draft of a revised constitution. During this period, they also reinforced local and the national military coordination committees and created their own executive body, the Supreme Military Council.

The fourth phase began with the deposition of Haile Selassie in September. The Emperor was driven off in a Volkswagen, and the mutineers assumed complete control. Political power was effectively vested in a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). The assumption of power was accompanied by the domination of the progressives and the articulation of a socialist-tinged policy, particularly the nationalization of imperial and aristocratic wealth and of select manufacturing and industrial enterprises, with an emphasis on stamping out corruption. Since 70 percent of Ethiopia's modern economy was already under government control, such measures seemed more symbolic than real.

The role of the military subsequently changed to reflect the vicissitudes of governing rather than of opposing. Some initial popular support for the armed forces began to erode. The PMAC proscribed some activities it had previously encouraged, including strikes and demonstrations. There was an inevitable feeling that the civilians had been let down. In a dramatic move, the soldiers told university and high school students that they must fight poverty, illness and illiteracy, and they must explain the new government's policy to the people at large. Tens of thousands of students were given uniforms and packed off to rural areas. Whether the soldiers will reap what they intended to sow remains to be seen; articulate students may well see a unique opportunity to plant their own fruit in the countryside.

The military government faced three kinds of

domestic challenges, all plagued with an inherent instability that will tax their skills and ingenuity. First, the new rulers had to replace the ancien regime with a viable political system, or at least to lay its foundations. This involved the containment of a suddenly released and explosive yearning for freedom, adding an edge of danger for any government seeking to guide the country into a new era. In their quest for essential legitimacy, the military, as of February, 1975, had a number of accomplishments to their credit. They identified significant economic and political grievances, and seemed able to cajole, manipulate, or sidestep demands by urban groups that were probably also groping for policy direction.

The search for a new regime also involved dismantling the old, and containing viable social forces and structures outside major urban centers that retain the advantages of long experience, familiarity, and legitimacy. The former Emperor's power base, less absolute than some would have it, involved chiefly the manipulation of regional, traditional forces, the Emperor's personality and his gifts of persuasion, the potent symbolism of long and proud historical continuity, and an established state church and concentrated land ownership with strong vested interests. The techniques used by the military to silence this complex network seemed successful: the gradual erosion of imperial authority, punctuated by coups to obtain government and imperial compliance, all the while carefully letting public opprobrium settle on the existing system and at the same time avoiding civil war.

Nonetheless, barring the emergence of an outstanding military leader blessed with the acumen and disposition to act as a political leader in his own right, the military barely neutralized the top of the power base. Whether they can construct a new base out of rural and urban groups and lay foundations for a new political order remains to be seen. Changes in Addis Ababa and other urban centers, radical though they seem, cannot be equated with fundamental or acceptable change in Ethiopian society. Formidable communications difficulties and isolation may reinforce recalcitrance to novel social experiments and turn into centripetal forces—the writ of Addis seems to extend only remotely to the rural periphery.

The second domestic challenge was disunity and turmoil within the armed forces. Ethiopia's armed forces (estimated at between 45,000 and 50,000 men) consist of the usual three branches plus a number of specialized units. The 41,000-man ground force has four infantry divisions, one of which is the imperial bodyguard. Their command headquarters are in Addis Ababa, Harrar, and Dessie, but most troops are concentrated in the capital and in the two territorial troublespots, Eritrea and Ogaden. The 3,000-man air force has its main base at Debra Zeit near

Addis, and the embryonic navy performs coast guard functions in the Red Sea. Neither the officer corps nor the ranks are ethnically homogeneous; they are dominated by Amhara, with some Tigre and Galla. There is also a territorial army controlled by the interior ministry, created in the provinces by the Emperor as a possible balance to the regular armed forces. Police forces include a national contingent of some 30,000 men, and a highly trained and mobile elite emergency force.

Since February, 1974, evolving political structures in the armed forces have only partially followed traditional hierarchy and separation. These evolving structures were not immune to the internal stress characteristic of the military elsewhere in Africa. Among the most potent were (1) political structures related to different functions and endowed with specific loyalties, (2) a cumbersome decision-making process by committee, (3) personality clashes, (4) ideological disagreements regarding attachment to the system and visions of the future, (5) generation differences, (6) different views about the political role of the armed forces, (7) differences between officers and soldiers, (8) ethnic frictions, and (9) competition for leadership. There were three loose but visible social groups cutting across the military organization: one loyal to the Emperor and the system, one favoring gradual change toward a constitutional monarchy, and a more "radical" group inclined to abolish the monarchy. Much of the first group was purged. The second and third at first tended to cooperate closely. But the third, more active and enterprising, gained control of the armed forces by year's end.

These social groups found expression in active committees consisting of soldiers and junior officers (none above the rank of major). Since the units in which they were based had different functions, direct command channels to the top, and distinct personalities and loyalties, common agreement on policy issues was difficult. Thus they occasionally acted independently. To devise national policy, a coordinating committee of the armed forces emerged, with representation from each service and each major unit, the imperial bodyguard, the territorial army, the police, and two military academies.

The national committee included at least a dozen different delegations, and its membership varied between 80 and 120. To bridge such disparate units and loyalties was a major task. About half the officer corps were graduates of Ethiopian military schools and many were trained in the United States (the role of overarching loyalties based on foreign service in Korea and the Congo, if any, was not discernible). The cumbersome nature of a large quasi-parliamentary body added to the difficulty. Some of the coordinating committee's studied anonymity was lifted

in June, as the existence of an executive committee of between 8 and 12 men became public knowledge. The national committee was chaired by front men: at first by Lieutenant General Aman Andom, then by Brigadier General Teferi Benti, a 53 year-old Galla from the second division and the former commander of Harrar military academy, who was also made acting head of state after the Emperor was deposed. Two strong junior officers also emerged as the committee's leaders: Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, a Harrar graduate and ordnance officer of the third division, and Major Atnafu Abate, who had a reputation for being more radical than Mengistu.

The military forces adjusted their behavior depending on whether they pursued or held power. Before the takeover, they cultivated the support of significant urban groups, particularly in Addis Ababa. But once they accepted full responsibility for governing the country, they reneged on or downgraded earlier commitments. They also apparently shared some of the liabilities of soldiers in political office elsewhere in Africa. There were traces of contempt for, or dislike of, civilians and of the political process, and of a military and/or radical puritanism.

#### **SUMMARY EXECUTIONS**

Because of the military's caution, the world was stunned to learn that they had directed the summary executions, on November 23, 1974, of 60 high-ranking civilian and military officials and had shot to death Lieutenant General Aman Andom, chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and defense minister.

General Aman had resigned his posts a week earlier, after major policy disagreements with the committee. He had refused to endorse a proposal to send more troops to Eritrea to seek a military victory; instead, he believed in the wisdom of a political solution and negotiations toward a large measure of autonomy for the province. He had thus begun talks with rebel leaders, which, as an Eritrean, he hoped to bring to a successful conclusion. He also reportedly refused to sign an order to massacre 59 prominent compatriots. The general was subsequently accused of crimes against the nation, placed under house arrest, and asked to surrender. His house was demolished by heavy weapons and he was killed.

The military forces announced that anyone who opposed them "will be committing a crime against the people." Twenty-nine civilians and 30 military personnel were killed by machine guns at the Addis central prison; three of them were brought from a hospital for the ceremony, two on stretchers. The

executed civilians included two former Prime Ministers (Endalkatchew Makonnen among them), ten former provincial governors, and other ex-ministers. Among the military were 16 generals, one rear-admiral, three colonels, one major, four captains, one lieutenant, and three enlisted men.<sup>3</sup>

The progressives in control of the armed forces may have viewed the prominent and popular general's disaffection as a danger to them, and then quickly decided to massacre the others to help "legitimize" their action, suggesting that they were punishing a group bearing some responsibility for the ills of their country. Because of the lack of any judicial process, they also left the impression that the executions were a function not of specific wrongdoings but of disagreements within anonymous military committees. Moreover, the executions and the uncertainty about the fate of the Emperor touched off widespread and unprecedented adverse world reactions. Many African and other countries, the Organization of African Unity that the Emperor had helped create and the United Nations General Assembly called upon the armed forces to stop the executions and spare the life of Haile Selassie.

The military may have miscalculated reaction abroad, forgetting that the Emperor is still widely regarded as a courageous symbol of resistance to foreign oppression and of African nationalism. Whether the armed forces, as an institution, can surmount their partial blindness remains to be seen. Purges, assassinations, arrests, and commissions of inquiry may remove existing institutions; but they are less effective tools for building a political system.

The third major domestic challenge relates to long-standing, regionally based demands for greater autonomy. Any Ethiopian government must cope with the imperfect identification of many geographically remote and dispersed groups with Addis Ababa. Christians in Tigre and Gojjam in the north, Galla in the center, and Muslim Somali in the south have long resented Amhara domination. Sultan Ali Meriah, paramount chief of the Afar people in the south, has maintained a considerable degree of independence, reinforced by religious, ethnic, and geographic factors. But there have also been reports of separatist movements in the north in Tigre, Gojjam, and Begemdir. There was a Tigre Liberation Front, led by Mengesha Seyoum, a possible pretender to the Ethiopian throne. In the other two provinces, traditional lords and an army officer were reportedly levying private armies, and there was some talk of possible collaboration against the Addis government.

In Addis, these issues are regarded as threats to Ethiopia's territorial integrity, and are treated with the classic African postindependence resolve to prevent secession at any cost, if only because success may encourage emulation and cause incalculable

<sup>3</sup> *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political Series, vol. 11, no. 11 (December 15, 1974), p. 3431C.



harm in a continent where endemic instability is difficult enough.

### ERITREAN UNREST

The most serious unrest was in Eritrea, a narrow band of territory along the 540-mile Red Sea coast, the only outlet for an otherwise landlocked country. Although they are Ethiopians, Eritreans are nevertheless distinctive; the advantages of Italian colonialism included educational opportunities and political sophistication. Many Eritreans have found congenial employment in Addis Ababa, but the unrest of the province has long been allowed to simmer. Eritrea is a "piece of Ethiopian plateau, Christian and watered, and a piece of Sudanese plain, Muslim and dry."<sup>4</sup> Like people elsewhere in black Africa, the coastal people look back on long contact with outsiders. Controlled by Turks and Egyptians since the sixteenth century, Eritrea was invaded by Italians in the late 1880's. Many Eritreans became Muslim—about half the present two million people. Eritrea developed a vibrant political life after the British displaced the Italians in 1941; a major issue that emerged was the nature of its relations with Addis.

Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952, then reintegrated by simple annexation in 1962 as a province governed from Addis. The central government took a dim view of the unaccustomed Eritrean political life, which it slowly emasculated. Given the heavy hand of pacification, some Eritrean leaders went into exile and created the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) under the banner of separatism. In the 1960's, ELF struggled for public support at home. Later it adopted guerrilla tactics, engaged government troops in sporadic fighting, and gained some international recognition.

During 1974, Eritreans became progressively disenchanted with the military regime, which they perceived as intransigent toward their objective of greater autonomy. Liberation forces regrouped and initiated cooperation in the armed struggle against the common enemy. A common front consisted of the older Revolutionary Command and the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), a 1971 offshoot, drawing support mostly from urban Christians and known for its Marxist orientation. Taking advantage of the central government's convulsions, the front secured heavy weapons and moved more trained men into the province. At the end of January, 1975, it began a joint offensive through frequent hit and run attacks and occasional open battles against government troops and installations. The front proved to be resourceful, dedicated, and stronger than anticipated; it tied down over half the armed forces and controlled most of the province's countryside. Its objectives included the isolation of Asmara, greater

popular support, and the internationalization of the struggle. After weeks of heavy fighting and heavy casualties, mostly civilian, government troops regained control of Asmara. The guerrillas lost a military battle against a vastly superior force; but they also won a resounding political victory, demonstrating that if they could not force a military solution, neither could the central military government.

In addition to serious domestic problems, Ethiopia also contended with external perils. There were Somali claims for part of Ethiopia's territory in the southern province of Ogaden, whose Muslim inhabitants are closely related to the Somali. The Mogadishu government has not abandoned its claims, and no doubt would also like to annex part of the French territory of the Afar and Issa, if possible, with the cooperation of Ethiopian Afar. It is fortunate that although Somalia strengthened her military power with modern weapons that raised serious concern in Kenya and Ethiopia, she remained inactive on the Ethiopian issue. A simultaneous two-front war could stretch Ethiopian military capabilities to the limit and escalate into regional conflict.

### FOREIGN SUPPORT

The gravest danger that faced the Ethiopian military government was mounting Arab assistance to the Eritrean Liberation Front. The front could not have mounted its offensive and made such a good showing without substantial external support. In the 1960's, ELF received some diplomatic and national backing from the Soviet Union and China, but most of its support came from the more radical Arab states, and more recently from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The PLF, on the other hand, looked chiefly to Yemen, Syria, and Libya and, more recently, to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Libyan government alone reportedly provided some \$5 million in heavy weapons to the PLF, and arms had been moving into Eritrea through the Sudan and by ship from across the Red Sea. Arab objectives include the expansion of their influence, control of the Red Sea, a friendly Eritrean government, and the further isolation of

*(Continued on page 230)*

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Before joining the faculty at the University of Colorado, Walter Skurnik was an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania Military College from 1963 to 1965. He is a frequent contributor to journals on African affairs and is the author of "The Military in Dahomey," in Claude E. Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), *Foreign Policy of Senegal* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), and a forthcoming book, *International Relations: Sub Saharan Africa* (Detroit: Gale Research), on international relations in black Africa.

<sup>4</sup> *Jeune Afrique*, no. 370-71 (January 3-10, 1975), p. 18.



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*"Can the revolutionary leadership [of Portugal's former colonies] escape the inefficiency, corruption and elitism of the colonial rulers and the governments of some of the former French and British territories? Will the new governments succeed in hammering out an authentic national culture?"*

## End of an Empire: Portugal's Collapse in Africa

BY THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN

*Associate Professor of History, State University of New York, College at Plattsburgh*

THE "WINDS OF CHANGE" that swept Africa in the early 1960's, transforming European colonial empires into a mosaic of politically independent states, have now overwhelmed Portuguese resistance to decolonization. First in and last out of Africa as a colonial power, Portugal finally has been forced to relinquish her hold on Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Guinea). Lisbon's withdrawal was accomplished by the force of African arms; the peaceful entreaties of the nationalists were met with a cold heart and a ready gun. For more than a decade, Europe's poorest country absurdly maintained about 180,000 troops in three smoldering guerrilla wars in an attempt to prolong its imperial twilight for the benefit of a commercial oligarchy. In the end, the exertions of the counter-insurgency wars not only unhinged a 500-year connection with Africa but also toppled the ultranationalist government in Portugal herself.

But the April 25, 1974, coup in Portugal represents much more than the ousting of a 48-year-old authoritarian regime. Because the war-weary military and naval officers behind the new government strove to cut loose Portugal's African empire, they rang down a final curtain on direct European political domination of non-European peoples—a domination inaugurated by the Portuguese. Overseas European expansion began in 1415 with the Portuguese conquest of the Saharan trade terminus of Ceuta, now in modern-day Morocco. Then Portuguese enterprise took to the seas to seek wealth, converts to Christianity, and glory. Under the persistent prodding of Portugal's most famous historical figure, Prince Henry, Portuguese mariners hesitantly sailed down and around Africa to reach India and the East, initiating what one distinguished historian termed the Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian history (1498–1945).

They were followed by other Europeans. Striving after their own fortune, Dutch, French and English predators conquered and colonized large slices of Africa and the Orient. After World War II, these European empires collapsed, but Lisbon stubbornly clung to its African colonies. To escape the rising United Nations chorus against colonialism, orchestrated by newly independent states, Lisbon redesignated its colonies as "overseas provinces" in 1951. Within the colonies, Portugal kept a tight lid on African politics and antimetropolitan sentiments, while the British, French and Belgians dismantled the controls in their possessions.

### THE ROOTS OF RESISTANCE

Since the earliest contacts between seaborne invader and African defender, African resistance to Portugal's expansion has been constant, in spite of Portuguese success in attracting indigenous auxiliaries and pitting one ethnic group against another. Until the late nineteenth century, lack of land power confined Portuguese penetration to a handful of coastal, riverine and island forts or trading posts. Meanwhile, after 1700, Portugal's declining maritime supremacy was matched by her neglect of her African possessions. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Portugal's interest in Africa revived because she feared that other European states would seize lands that she claimed on the map but did not then occupy. To secure recognition of their extravagant claims, the Portuguese embarked on "pacification" campaigns to crush resistance and subjugate the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. These wars of conquest lasted until the second decade of this century. By this time, African intellectuals had begun a protest in organizations and newspapers that enjoyed a brief tolerance under the Portuguese

Republic (1910–1926). Once the New State regime of António de Oliveira Salazar came to power, the freedoms of press and assembly were throttled. African opposition was driven underground and into exile until it surfaced in armed struggle in the 1960's.

The African nationalism that relatively peacefully (except for Kenya and Algeria) dislodged other European states from their colonies after World War II was repressed in Portuguese Africa. At Guinea-Bissau's Pijiguiti docks in 1959 and in the northern Mozambican town of Mueda in 1960, African demonstrators encountered deadly rifle fire from colonial troops. Before the Angolan rebellion, these incidents pointed up the futility of nonviolent protests in urban areas and made it clear that the road to independence depended on guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Violence begot violence.

### THE WARS

The Angolan war, the first of the three, started after a nearly spontaneous uprising in the northern cotton-growing region, which killed some 400 settlers and thousands of Africans.<sup>1</sup> The rebels did not pursue their gains, and the colonial government recovered the initiative in all but a few small pockets of resistance. As the war dragged on, the Portuguese faced three separate and uncooperating Angolan nationalist movements, which made incursions in the east and north. The Angolan lessons were not lost on the nationalists in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

African nationalists planned the opening of hostilities in Guinea-Bissau (1962) and Mozambique (1964) after a two-year period of training fighters and cadre and politicizing the peasantry in the intended war zones. They had the important advantage, lacking in Angolan nationalism, of single, dominant parties with outstanding leaders. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) experienced limited fragmentation and rival groups, but their mastery was never eclipsed even when their party heads were assassinated by dissident members with the complicity of the Portuguese. The PAIGC's Secretary General, Amílcar Cabral, a Lisbon-trained agronomist before his revolutionary career, became the foremost theoretician of the anti-Portuguese struggle.

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the Angolan war and much of Angola's history, see Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

<sup>2</sup> An easily accessible source of many of Cabral's ideas is found in Amílcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, translated by Richard Handyside (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

<sup>3</sup> For a digest of Mondlane's political philosophy, see Thomas H. Henriksen, "The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane," *Genève-Afrique*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1973), pp. 37–52.

His emphasis on the role of national culture in revolutionary warfare and his down-to-earth proposals to motivate a peasantry were significant even after his assassination in 1973.<sup>2</sup> FRELIMO's Eduardo Mondlane received his Ph.D. and had married in the United States before he returned to assume the presidency of the nationalist front. Mondlane was a great, lion-hearted man, whose pragmatic outlook and racial tolerance toward whites still influence FRELIMO policies and actions six years after he was murdered by a bomb placed in a package.<sup>3</sup> These assassinations hurt the nationalists but failed to derail the liberation movement from its course.

Today, Guinea-Bissau's independence is recognized by Portugal and more than 80 other nations. The offshore Cape Verde Islands with which the PAIGC wants political union are scheduled for freedom on July 5. Mozambican nationalists signed an agreement at Lusaka with Lisbon's post-coup government on September 7, 1974, imposing a cease-fire and granting sovereignty. As part of the Lusaka agreement, Mondlane's successor, Samora Machel, and Portuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares negotiated a provisional government made up of FRELIMO leaders and Portuguese officials until independence on June 25. Since the agreement, FRELIMO has assumed more and more internal responsibilities as it has consolidated its position. At this writing, Angola's transition to independence seems the most problematic. Lisbon has agreed to a cease-fire and to grant Angolan freedom, but the problems of the war continue to plague the peace. Angolan nationalism, badly fractured by contending groups during the struggle, remains divided by feuds.

The wars in the three colonies were similar. In each colony, the African challengers launched guerrilla warfare in areas remote from friendly sanctuary states. Supplied with small arms by China and the Soviet Union, and furnished with funds and non-military equipment from Scandinavian countries and progressive groups elsewhere in the West, the insurgents gradually widened their spheres of occupation. In liberated zones, they set up rudimentary schools, health dispensaries and village governments. Some villages with cooperative farms and warm camaraderie for the guerrillas became showplaces for sympathetic observers and journalists. All the insurgents appealed for recognition and aid and a suspension of aid and recognition for Lisbon, which heavily relied on its NATO allies for arms and counterinsurgency expertise.

Against the nationalists, Portugal used the all-too-familiar weapons of counterinsurgency: conventional "sweep and destroy" drives, bombing and napalming of suspected enemy villages, heliborne retaliatory raids, regroupment of rural people in fortified villages (*aldeamentos*), a program to "win the hearts and

minds" of the people with increased education, medical treatment and improved living conditions. Portugal also inaugurated showpiece development schemes from which she could derive dividends and praise from her allies. During the war, she undertook two large projects—the Cunene River irrigation scheme in southern Angola and the giant hydroelectric dam at Cabora Bassa in Tete, the northwestern district of Mozambique. Still another Lisbon maneuver, dictated by the gradual tilt of the military balance away from Portugal, involved the relabeling of the colonies as "states" in 1972, without grants of meaningful rights to the African majority. Worthy as some of her service programs were, Portugal's efforts came too late and were too limited to stay the rising nationalist tide.

The military and nonmilitary burdens taxed Portugal's archaic economy and retarded her industrialization, already the least developed in West Europe. Over a million men fled from Portugal to avoid the draft and to seek higher wages for their skills in France and Germany. To fill the ranks in an area 23 times the size of the tiny metropole, after 1966 Lisbon enlisted Africans in ever larger numbers into the militia, army and special commando units; Africans comprised about 60 percent of Portugal's forces by war's end. Portugal was attempting to Africanize the wars, to minimize white casualties and transportation costs, and to increase Portugal's tiny manpower pool. Portugal's 8.2 million population and her subsequent shortages of manpower are among the most important causes of Portugal's defeat.

In Angola, three main divergent movements made inroads in varying depths into the country from Zaire and Zambia: the National Front of Angolan Liberation (FNLA) in the north, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the north and east, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the east. Ideological, personal, ethnic and regional differences split the groups and kept them feuding to the advantage of the Portuguese.<sup>4</sup> Neither in Mozambique nor in Guinea-Bissau were the exile politics or relationships in the field so complex and hostile as in Angola.

The guerrillas of Guinea-Bissau, fanning out from their sanctuaries in Senegal and the Republic of Guinea over most of the low-lying land, claimed occupation of two-thirds of the country on September 24, 1973, when Aristide Pereira, Cabral's successor, announced the country's independence. The country was in the hands of the PAIGC, except for the capital

city of Bissau and other besieged fortress towns and bases, provisioned and reinforced by air, heavily patrolled roads or waterways. Nearly a year after the nationalists' proclamation, Lisbon's military junta recognized the colony's sovereignty. Portugal's obstinate retention of Guinea-Bissau had been predicated on a Lusitanian domino theory: if the small, wedge-shaped rice- and peanut-producing territory on the upper west African coast, with less than 3,000 whites (mostly shopkeepers and company representatives), was lost, it would foreshadow the loss of Portugal's two important colonies in southern Africa.

Operating principally from bases in southern Tanzania, FRELIMO guerrilla fighters secured territory along Lake Malawi and, to the east, on the Makonde Plateau. When Portuguese defense measures and ethnic animosities slowed the drive southward, in 1969, the guerrillas shifted their main effort to Tete, where they first attempted to "bust" the Cabora Bassa. Two years later, they turned with more success to mining and ambushing the approaches to the construction site. By the winter of 1973–1974, political cadre and guerrilla fighters streamed through the narrow waist of the country "like fleas through a rug." Ranging almost at will and harassing rail and road communications with near impunity, FRELIMO catapulted the Mozambican theater into the army's hot spot. So desperately had the military situation deteriorated by early 1974 that Lisbon dispatched Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Francisco da Costa Gomes (now Portugal's President) for an assessment. He apparently concluded that the army was unable to defend settlers in rural areas of the central zone without massive reinforcements that were beyond Lisbon's overstretched capabilities. The war was not only unwinnable but could no longer be restricted to the poor, thinly populated back country.

This worsening situation persuaded Marcelo Caetano, Portugal's Prime Minister and since 1968 Salazar's successor, to recognize a multiracial Mozambican party, the United Group of Mozambique (GUMO). GUMO advocated autonomy from Lisbon and thus took a middle course between a white separatist state and an independent African Mozambique. More significantly, Caetano approved the publication of General António de Spínola's book, *Portugal and the Future*.<sup>5</sup> In it the former governor and commander-in-chief of Guinea-Bissau acknowledged the futility of a "a military solution" to "a subversive war" and suggested a political solution—autonomy for the African states within a Lusitanian Federation in order to salvage the Portuguese position in Africa. The book's widely read dovish message provoked the government to dismiss Spínola and helped bring on the coup which overturned the dictatorship.

The coup's consequences were no less dramatic in

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the early revolt and conflicts in Angolan nationalism, see John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. 1: *The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–1962* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969).

<sup>5</sup> For a further discussion of and quotations from General Spínola's book, see *Africa Report*, vol. 19, no. 2 (March/April, 1974), pp. 37–39.

Africa. Although the newly formed Junta for National Salvation, headed by Spínola, initially resisted giving the colonies full independence, it was forced to do so by continued nationalist advances, especially in Mozambique, and by pressure from the radical junior officers of the Armed Forces Movement, the prime mover for the coup and the democratization of Portuguese society. A revolution devours its children, and the younger officers ousted the more conservative Spínola from the presidency on September 30, 1974.

When the junta relaxed some of the former regime's restraints, white and black political activity, severely suppressed under the New State, burst into the open in Angola and Mozambique. Guinea-Bissau, with its miniscule European population, underwent no rebirth of settler politics. In the two colonies of austral Africa, settler opinion ran a wide spectrum from fear and hostility toward African nationalism to an endorsement of majority (African) rule based on "realism," from chafing at the Salazarian curbs on political freedoms and commercial pursuits to approval of a white supremacist state modeled after Rhodesia. Younger whites from the universities and from the professional classes generally favored independence under African rule, considering themselves white Angolans or white Mozambicans. Settlers from the working and poorer classes held—and hold—views akin to those of the former French settlers in Algeria during her independence turmoil. Like the French settlers, they turned to secret organizations, threats and violence to head off what they perceived as a "sellout" by Lisbon of their rights and "civilization" to terrorists inspired by Communists.

White settler opposition to African government and racial tensions resulted in a number of individual assaults and mass clashes during the summer and fall of 1974. In Angola's capital, Luanda, two large-scale riots exploded in July and August, leaving nearly 200 dead. Lourenço Marques, the capital of Mozambique, witnessed an abortive coup at the news of the Lusaka agreement. Calling for a revolt, disaffected whites blew up an arsenal and seized the radio station. The attempt failed, but in consequence the African suburbs around the city began to riot. Before Portuguese and FRELIMO troops acting together could restore order, 87 people died. Two weeks later, in mid-September, another racial clash left 48 dead, again mostly African. Meanwhile, in Angola, the authorities discovered a right-wing plot to seize power. Some 15,000 to 20,000 whites fled Mozambique because of the bloodshed and the coming independence. They crowded flights to Portugal and flocked across the border to South Africa, from whence some moved on to Angola. No such mass exodus has yet been reported from Angola—perhaps

an omen of strong white resistance to majority rule.

Accompanying and, in some cases, inciting white violence, small parties and lobbies have proliferated, manifesting the multiplicity of settler opinion. Mozambique's white separatists, who favored a Rhodesian "solution," coalesced into FICO (Front for Independence and Continuity with the West). Members of FICO, which in Portuguese means "I am staying," staged anti-FRELIMO demonstrations and participated in the stillborn coup, but the movement never took root. One extremist party, the United Angolan Resistance (RUA), flourished until the government jailed its leader. Other groups probably exist but are hidden by a veil of secrecy.

Rumors that white mercenary soldiers were mobilizing in Rhodesia and South Africa where they were being hired by disgruntled Mozambican businessmen gradually died in the cold light of reality. Across the continent, however, threats of mercenary invasions continue to add to the uncertainty and lead to warnings of "another Congo" in Angola. The specter of the Congo (now Zaire), cast adrift in anarchy and haste by its Belgian colonizer in 1960, haunts both Angola and Mozambique.

Even less helpful to a speedy and peaceful settlement of the Angolan dispute are the lingering splits among the three principal guerrilla movements. None have disbanded their private armies and all cache arms in the cities. Further confusion arises from recent divisions within the MPLA. Clashes between rival groups have been noted. Another thorny issue blocking an Angolan solution is whether to grant separate independence to Cabinda, the oil-rich enclave rimmed by Zaire, or include it within Angola. As Cabinda's wealth promises "another Kuwait," her small population wants its own sovereignty. The separate independence of the coffee and cocoa islands of São Tomé and Príncipe off the west coast, due July 12, establishes a precedent for Cabinda. But the settlement divides Angolan politicians, some of whom demand that the joint administration of the two territories be maintained. It is widely believed that Zaire's President Joseph Mobutu has designs on the territory.

Prolonged attempts to reach an agreement among the feuding parties finally succeeded on January 10 in Alvor, on Portugal's southern coast, where an elaborate interim government was established to prepare for Angolan independence on November 11, 1975. In the transition apparatus, each party is to share power and to participate in an election of a constituent assembly in October, which will elect the country's President, who will then formally accept sovereignty from Lisbon. Beneath the surface, the agreement may be more a truce than a genuine solution to Angola's political factionalism. An African power struggle, with whites siding with one faction or



another, is possible either before independence or shortly afterward. If post-independent African history is any indication, the emergence of a single party with a single leader without rivals seems a likely forecast.

### THE PULLOUT AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Portugal's pullout is the most significant change in southern Africa's political configuration since the breakup of the white-dominated Central African Federation in 1963 and the resulting freedom of Malawi and Zambia under African governments and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia's white minority government. Like those events, Lisbon's withdrawal signals the advancement of African nationalism into the foot of the continent, where white-controlled regimes in Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa find themselves increasingly encircled. Landlocked and now almost surrounded by African states opposed to a white minority (270,000 settlers) domination of the African majority (nearly 6 million), Rhodesian whites more keenly feel the geopolitical isolation than they have at any time since Rhodesia's UDI from Britain in 1965. Rhodesia has relied on trade transit across Mozambique and has depended on the kindred regime in South Africa for military and diplomatic support.

Now circumstances are altered. FRELIMO has warned that Mozambique may be closed to Rhodesian trade, in accordance with the United Nations' sanctions that the Portuguese have willingly circumvented. The recently completed railway connecting Rhodesia with congested South African ports will only partially compensate for the loss. Furthermore, South Africa, herself hard pressed in the United Nations for her racial segregation policy known as *apartheid* and for her defiant retention of South-West Africa (Namibia to nationalists), has pushed Rhodesia to make concessions to create stability in the region. Since December, 1972, Rhodesia's defense forces have been engaged in the northeast district against guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African Nation Union (ZANU).<sup>6</sup> FRELIMO assists ZANU and offers bases to the Rhodesian guerrillas.

Cognizant of her fresh vulnerability, Rhodesia has made a turnabout unimaginable before the Lisbon coup. In late 1974, Prime Minister Ian Smith released black political leaders from detention, as part of an agreement for a cease-fire and for negotiations leading to full African citizenship. Although Smith's "ghastly capitulation" is not universally applauded among Rhodesian whites, it marks a political somer-

sault in line with the changed situation in southern Africa.

South Africa, the industrial and military kingpin of the white southern Africa subsystem, has also been affected by Portugal's sudden collapse. Prior to the announced withdrawal, she could count on Angola and, more particularly, on Mozambique, with which she shares a common border, to serve as buffer states against black nationalism. Now, in the case of Mozambique, that safeguard is surely lost. In the short run, however, FRELIMO's internal difficulties—strikes and unrest, a balance-of-payments deficit and food scarcities—make it unlikely that Mozambique will become a springboard for nationalist assaults on South Africa. Instead, FRELIMO has opted for what one South African official characterized as "well-founded realism" toward its powerful neighbor, allowing South Africa to purchase (as originally planned under Portuguese rule) a lion's share of the soon-to-be-generated electrical power from the Cabora Bassa dam. FRELIMO has also agreed to allow vital migratory labor to travel to the South African gold mines, which benefits the economies of both countries. The economic survival of Mozambique has been tied to South Africa's use of Mozambique's ports and workers for so long that to have cut the dependence suddenly would have been catastrophic. Initially, Mozambique's weakness might play into the hands of Pretoria, long familiar with exploiting dependent neighbors. But in the long run a revolutionary Mozambique, tempered by an arduous liberation war, may prove less pliable than Pretoria's established client states of Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. A rise of black nationalism in South Africa or some as yet unforeseen circumstance could trigger FRELIMO's commitment to a liberation struggle abroad.

Realistically aware of her growing encirclement both on the continent and in the world, South Africa debates her membership in the United Nations and promises changes in her *apartheid* system while she arms and stockpiles weapons, munitions, raw materials and oil against an African judgment day. The deeper significance of Portugal's withdrawal, then, is the removal of the barriers between a beleaguered racial system and the forces of African nationalism. Change and more change are the prospects for austral Africa.

For the former Portuguese colonies, prophecies are hazardous. Foreign interest in Angola's rich natural resources, divided nationalist groups, and recalcitrant

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Thomas H. Henriksen has published a number of articles on aspects of Portugal in Africa and African resistance to colonialism. He is now completing a history of Mozambique.

<sup>6</sup> Zimbabwe is the African nationalist term for Rhodesia; Africans disapprove of the name Rhodesia, taken from the name of Cecil Rhodes, regarded as the arch imperialist of southern Africa.

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*"Regardless of the direction of the political order in Nigeria, the federal and state governments seem likely to face more difficult conditions in the immediate future than they faced in the recent past. Intractable problems have accumulated, and they must be handled by military governments with declining support, and with a revenue from oil which . . . is no longer increasing in amount at the rate that it increased each year since 1970."*

## Nigeria: The Experience of Military Rule

BY DAVID J. MURRAY

*Professor of Government, The Open University, Milton Keynes, England*

IT IS JUST FIVE YEARS since Nigeria emerged from a major civil war. In the late 1960's, the country came close to disintegrating, with the attempted formation of the state of Biafra by the Ibo peoples of the Eastern Region and other secessionist moves in the Western and Northern Regions. Nigeria, however, survived to defeat the rebel forces. In the meantime, the four constituent regions of the first Nigerian Federation had become twelve states in a new Federation; and the parliamentary democracy established under the constitution of the first Republic had become a military dictatorship. Now, five years later, an ever present army remains as a reminder of the civil war. But otherwise the war belongs to the past, and Nigerians are generally preoccupied with achieving personal success in a booming economy, and finding ways to practice the partisan politics that remain formally illegal.

The army took control of the government in Nigeria in two coups d'état in 1966. Since then, in its top-level positions, the country has been ruled by military or police officers, with one solitary civilian governor in the Ibo East Central State. The civil war greatly increased this military presence: because of the war, the armed forces were expanded. No moves were made substantially to reduce them when the war ended, so the military forces currently have a strength of about 250,000 men.

This large and expensive force is one relic of the civil war. Otherwise, war-related problems are strikingly few. Significantly, the release of the last of the rebel soldiers held since the war was announced in the fall of 1974. In the treatment meted out to the Ibos there is little of any vindictive spirit. The Ibo peoples of the East Central State are

accepted as Nigerian citizens. There appears to be a certain hesitation in admitting them to sensitive positions in the armed forces and police, but, otherwise, they compete on the same terms as other Nigerians. Ibos, themselves, devote their enterprise and skill not to creating a Biafran laager, but to exploiting the great opportunities available to those with business acumen, drive and professional competence across the country.

In the non-Ibo areas of the former Eastern Region certain strains do exist. Conflicts between Ibos and non-Ibos along the border between the East Central and South East and Rivers States have made demands on the mobile paramilitary police. Furthermore, particularly in the Rivers State, there is a continuing distrust of the Ibos, which produces a mutual hostility that focuses on the issue of the return to the Ibos of property claimed by them and valued at between \$120 million and \$490 million in Port Harcourt, capital of the Rivers State and once a center for Ibo commercial and industrial enterprise. The Rivers State government claims that the title to this property has not been established. But its reluctance to settle the matter is related to its desire to prevent Ibos from returning to dominate the industrial and commercial life of the Rivers State before development in this hitherto backward area has provided its own citizens with the opportunity to play a larger part in economic affairs.

Otherwise, the attempted Biafran secession and problems arising from it are no longer in the forefront of affairs. What does stand out is Nigeria's thriving economic life, and the controversy over the country's political future.

Nigeria is experiencing an economic boom. In

statistical terms, the average annual rate of growth since 1970 has been 10.2 percent; there are practical manifestations of this growth throughout the country but it is most striking in the larger towns. Wherever one travels there is evidence of industrial development: work is going ahead on a second oil refinery at Warri in the Midwest State; preparations are in progress for the first national steel complex near Lokoja in Kwara State; and a large cement factory is sited at Ashaka in the North East State. Two car assembly plants, one at Lagos, the other in Kaduna, are in process of completion, and more modest industries are likewise appearing.

Then there are other signs of a boom. Striking wealth is juxtaposed with extreme poverty. Services are unable to cope with the demand so that there is, for example, gross congestion at the port at Lagos. There have been shortages of building materials, with specially acute difficulties over cement. Particularly in the larger towns, the effects of intense economic activity are apparent.

This rapid economic expansion is founded primarily on oil production, although other primary products make a contribution. Oil was originally struck in 1958, but Nigeria emerged as a major oil producer only after the civil war in 1970. In that year, oil accounted for 58 percent of exports by value, and since then oil production has increased rapidly so that, in 1972, oil accounted for 82 percent of the value of exports. By the end of 1973, when Nigeria adopted the policy of holding production of oil to no more than a moderate increase on the current production of 2 million barrels a day, she was the seventh largest oil-producing country in the world. In the fall of 1973, moreover, Nigeria had increased the price of oil from \$4.287 a barrel to \$8.310. The result of this, and of a further price rise on January 1, 1974, was that in the first six months of 1974 oil accounted for 92 percent of the value of Nigerian exports.

While oil has brought Nigeria staggering wealth in the last five years, the country has also benefited from the high level of world commodity prices. Nigeria remains, for example, the third largest exporter of cocoa in Africa and is a major exporter of groundnuts and tin.

The government's ruthless actions in ensuring that the wealth coming from the country's exports of oil and primary products are directed to indigenous Nigerians has contributed significantly to this boom in the economy. The government has progressively increased its own holdings in major foreign enterprises; in addition it decreed in 1972 that certain enterprises were to be reserved exclusively for Nigerians. The list covered such enterprises as the retail trade (other than department stores), road haulage and advertising. At the same time, 33 other

trades or types of enterprise were denied to non-Nigerians, if the share capital was less than approximately \$700,000 and if the turnover was less than approximately \$1,750,000. When foreign-owned enterprises exceeded these amounts, Nigerian participation in the form, for instance, of Nigerian ownership of equity capital was required to be not less than 40 percent.

These measures have been coupled with others designed to discourage those who are not indigenous Nigerians. There has been pressure on foreign firms to employ Nigerians in professional and managerial positions, and there are substantial practical problems in securing entry visas for the country. The law governing Nigerian citizenship has been altered to make it significantly more difficult for aliens to become citizens, and administrative action in the processing of applications has, in practice, further increased the obstacles.

Nigeria is committed to industrialization and economic development on the basis of capitalist free enterprise, but there is a determination that this should be operated by Nigerians for the benefit of Nigerians. What makes this practicable in Nigeria is that oil provides the necessary capital; at the same time, Nigerians have the necessary entrepreneurial skill.

Having achieved an average annual rate of growth of 10.2 percent in the last five years, Nigeria is just entering the period of her third five-year national development plan. In this plan, emphasis is placed on industrial development, in that 20 percent of investment over the five-year period is intended to be in industrial projects. The aim is for the country to be self-sufficient by the end of the period in petroleum products, petrochemicals and paper pulp. In the plan period, also, a substantial investment is anticipated in transport (14 percent), housing (7 percent) and school building (7 percent)—the latter arising from the commitment to initiate in 1976 a project to make primary education available to all children and to make such primary schooling compulsory in 1979.

In publicity about the plan, attention was directed to the emphasis placed on investment in agriculture. In practice, however, this investment constitutes less than 5 percent of the total proposed in the plan period. During 1974, Nigeria had to import food, and the country could become an importer of food on a substantial scale. If the censuses of 1952, 1963, and 1973 are to be believed, the country's population increased by nearly 22 million in 10 years and 49 million in 20 years, and the 1973 census places over 41 million people in the far northern states, which are affected by the Saharan drought and the spread southward of the desert. While the country can expect to be able to afford substantial food imports,

this may reflect a continuation of a present depression in the rural economy; a shift of population from rural areas to the towns at a rate that the country's industrialization cannot cope with; and a damaging decline in the agricultural potential of the far north of the country.

Current economic conditions and the planned investment in the next five years depend to a considerable degree on oil wealth. At the end of 1974 and in early 1975, there was a cut-back in the demand for Nigerian oil—which is relatively high priced—but oil will probably continue to fuel economic development. But this presupposes the political conditions for such growth.

### POLITICAL ORDER

While the economy has been booming, the country remains in a state of uncertainty about the political order. General Yakubu Gowon, the head of state, has made repeated declarations since the 1966 army takeover about the temporary nature of military rule and his desire to return to some form of elected civilian government. His own commitment to this has carried conviction, and has engendered respect for the country's military rulers. The stated intention was that military rule would end in 1976. In December, 1973, part of a timetable for this return of civilian rule was made public; it was announced that, with a view to the return of civilian government in 1976, the ban on political activities would be lifted after October, 1974. This was followed early in 1974 by a commitment to the establishment of a constituent assembly toward the end of 1976 to consider a new constitution for the country.

In practice during 1974, in the period leading up to the date after which political activities were to be formally permitted, military officers and party politicians from the first republic had been openly advancing particular causes. Military officers campaigned publicly for support for an extension of military rule and a relinquishment of the commitment to return to civilian government. On the other hand, civilian politicians made covert attacks on the military government, and otherwise sought to recreate their own political bases of support.

As the result, General Gowon made a speech on October 1, 1974—Independence Day—discarding the commitment to return to civilian government in 1976. Although he indicated that he still regarded military rule as temporary, its intended duration was not revealed. In his announcement, General Gowon stated:

We had thought that genuine demonstration of moderation and self-control in pursuing sectional ends in the overall interest of the country would have become the second nature of all Nigerians. Regrettably, from all the information at our disposal, from the general attitude,

utterances and manoeuvres of some individual groups and from some publications during the past few months, it is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt any lesson from past experience. . . . there has already emerged a high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances and writings which were deliberately designed to whip up ill feelings within the country to the benefit of the political aspirations of the few. . . . What the country and the ordinary citizen want is peace and stability, the only condition under which progress and development are possible. . . . Our own assessment of the situation as of now is that it will be utterly irresponsible to leave the nation in the lurch by a precipitate withdrawal which will certainly throw the nation back into confusion. Therefore the Supreme Military Council after careful deliberation and full consultation with the hierarchy of the Armed Forces and the Police has decided that the target date of 1976 is in the circumstances unrealistic, and that it would be a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to the target date.

It served the self-interest of the military to place the blame for a postponement of civilian government on civilian politicians. But it is difficult to reconcile the tradition of civilian politics with the stability needed to allow for continuing economic growth. The problem, however, is not intemperate speeches (which are only a surface characteristic) but a tradition in which the stakes in politics are high. That the winner takes all, and does so without significant constraining rules, is part of the experience of Nigerian politics. The disorder throughout the country from 1963 to the end of the civil war (even in the mid-1970's, under conditions of far greater wealth) was not conducive to rapid economic development.

Yet in condemning Nigerian politicians, General Gowon was also effectively exposing his government's failure to use the authority of a victorious military government (and the enormous wealth provided by oil) to structure political action, and to focus political debate, in a way that would differentiate the politics of the 1970's from those of the 1960's. As political debate reemerged in 1974, three issues fundamental to the future of the country remained in doubt, partly through inaction, partly through bad management, and partly through ill fortune. These same issues had been central to the political conflicts in the last years of civilian government. Inevitably, in the resulting debate, there were echoes in 1974 of what had gone on 10 years before.

The first issue concerns the distribution of Nigeria's population. Nigerians are aware that in an electoral system the distribution of population has a critical effect on the distribution of power. Likewise, the method of allocating revenue from oil (and other duties) partly on the basis of population further increases the significance of the distribution of population. The results of the 1963 census, and the way politically acceptable figures had to be produced under the label of the 1964 census, were major factors



in the developments that led to fighting within the army in 1966, and to the civil war. Yet the prelude to the formal authorization of renewed political activity in 1974 coincided with the publication of the 1973 census results. These showed some radical shifts in the supposed population pattern. Most worrying for many was the main change: the four far northern states had 54 percent of the population (as against 42 percent in 1963). These four states—North East, Kano, North Central and North West—contain the old Emirate states of the north; there live the Muslim, Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri peoples who, along with the Emirate organization, had provided the power base for the Northern Peoples Congress. The census revealed, therefore, that any electoral system where the vote of each would be approximately equal would produce a far-reaching shift in power toward the far north, if politics were to operate in the manner of the first republic. These striking results were accompanied by information about corroborated (if individual) instances of census-rigging in these far northern states. Thus the census emerged as a focus for discordant debate.

The census had, moreover, called into question the correctness of the state structure of the federation, and thus brought into the limelight another issue that was at the root of much trouble in the first Nigerian Federation. In the winner-take-all politics of the first Nigerian Federation, the way boundaries were drawn, and thus the way constituent regions (or states) were devised, determined who ruled and who secured all the benefits of state authority. The creation of twelve states to supersede the previous four regions helped to ease the situation, but minority groups within the twelve states sought further division. The census results accentuated this difficulty because they revealed not only that four states with some homogeneity had more than half the country's population, but that there was an even greater disparity between the population of each of these and that of the smaller states of the federation—with the largest, the North East State, having nearly seven times the population of the smallest state (the Rivers State). Thus, in 1974, attention was directed to a second issue that revived memories of the conflicts of the first Nigerian Federation, and prompted political groupings and affiliations on familiar lines.

The third issue to the fore in 1974 concerned the allocation of revenue. In the first Nigerian republic, the constitution provided that 50 percent of the proceeds of royalties received in respect of minerals were payable to the region from which those minerals derived, and 30 percent were paid into a distribution pool to be distributed between the regions on a given

basis. The appropriate way to distribute the proceeds of these duties and royalties—and particularly those resulting from oil—was a major matter in dispute in the last years of the first Nigerian Federation. At the heart of the debate was the issue of derivation—should a major part of the royalties deriving from a state belong as of right to that state? The constitution had provided for 50 percent; after the introduction of military government this was reduced to 45 percent; but there have been constant demands, by military governors as well as civilian politicians, for a change. Yet this had not been accomplished and in 1974–1975, for example, the federal statutory allocation brought \$350 million to the 2.2 million people in the Rivers State and \$487 million to the 3.2 million people in the Mid West, as against \$96 million for the 3.4 million people in the South East State and \$146 million for the 15.4 million in the North East. Only in the fall of 1974, when political activity was once more forbidden, did the military government grapple with this last issue and announce a decision. After April, 1975, the amount returned to a state on the basis of derivation was to be reduced from 45 percent to 20 percent.

That it took until the fall of 1974, after political activity was originally intended to be permitted once more, to announce this decision gives some indication of the unwillingness, or inability, of the military government to take decisions on fundamental questions crucial to the political order of the country. By failing to restore civilian government, the military has undermined its own credibility and has lost some of the authority that it needs if it is to act decisively. Commenting on General Gowon's speech, one major newspaper declared that restoring democratic rights was as important to Nigerians as economic progress and social well-being; another dismissed the sort of order envisaged by General Gowon as "impossible in a huge and diverse country with a fairly well developed political culture and with the political power prize being the privilege to dispense vast resources. Turbulence and controversy are second nature to this society." It went on to say: "The aim is to control and set a limit to the degree of turbulence, which is the stuff of politics and the stuff of life."<sup>1</sup>

(Continued on page 229)

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David J. Murray spent nearly ten years teaching in various African universities and conducting research in East, Central and West Africa. Nearly five of those years were spent in Nigeria. He has published many articles and five books in this area, among them *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), *The Work of Nigerian Administration* (London: Hutchinson, 1969) and *Studies in Nigerian Administration* (London: Hutchinson, 1970).

<sup>1</sup> *New Nigerian*, October 2, 1974.

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*"Barring a commitment by the major Western powers, as well as by the Security Council of the United Nations, a nonviolent transition in Namibia is not now conceivable."*

# Namibia and the International Court of Justice

BY MOTEE PERSAUD

*Former Instructor of Sociology, George Washington University*

NAMIBIA, FORMERLY KNOWN as South West Africa, covers an area of approximately 318,000 square miles along the South Atlantic coast and has a population of about 610,000. About two-thirds the size of South Africa, larger than France and Great Britain combined, the country is fringed by desert and shares a boundary line almost coterminous with that of South Africa.<sup>1</sup>

The indigenous people, of various tribal backgrounds, constitute approximately 84 percent of the population. As a result of South Africa's apartheid policy, they are confined to living on dehumanizing tribal reserves or bantustans in the barren northern third of the country. In contrast, the large and predominantly white southern section "incorporates the diamond fields, copper mines, rich agricultural lands and fishing ports."<sup>2</sup> While one in seven Namibians is white, the whites own twice as much land as the Africans and lead a comparatively affluent life as large farm holders, cattle ranchers or owners of various businesses. Black Namibians, on the other hand, exist in dire poverty and are bound by contract to serve in white-owned local and foreign enterprises at very low wages.

Initially, Namibia was colonized by Germany, but after the dissolution of the German Empire at the close of World War I she was mandated to South Africa under terms of an agreement incorporated in the newly formed League of Nations. The principles concerning the governance of mandates were embodied in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant which stipulated that:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty

of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the development and well-being of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization. . . .

The mandate agreement<sup>3</sup> defined the duties and obligations of the mandator and provided a mechanism for the administration and supervision of the mandate system. No sooner had South Africa assumed responsibilities over Namibia than conflicts emerged between South Africa and the Permanent Mandate Commission, the administrative organ of the League, with regard to South Africa's racial policies and the interpretation of the "sacred trust of civilization."

The outbreak of World War II halted all major activities of the League. With the creation of the United Nations in 1945, an International Trusteeship<sup>4</sup> system was established to assume responsibility over the mandated territories. However, the mandatory role of the United Nations was not clearly defined; as a consequence, many questions were enveloped in legal obscurities. Some of the unresolved issues concerned the sovereignty of the mandate, whether the mandate system continued as a treaty in force, whether or not the mandatory powers were obliged to conclude trusteeship agreements, and whether the United Nations was competent to exercise the supervisory functions of the defunct League of Nations. Essentially, these issues form the crux of the Namibian dispute.

## NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The United Nations Charter provided for the placement of the mandated territories under the aegis of the Trusteeship System without further delay. Accordingly, in its first session, in 1946, the General Assembly invited the respective mandatories to negotiate and conclude the necessary agreements for the transfer of the mandates. However, the

<sup>1</sup> Ruth First, *South West Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 25. United Nations, *A Trust Betrayed: Namibia* (New York: U.N. Office of Public Information, 1974), p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia*, vol. 1, 1974.

<sup>3</sup> See Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the *South West Africa Mandate*, December 17, 1920.

<sup>4</sup> Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Union of South Africa refused to do so and indicated its intention to incorporate Namibia.

The Union government emphasized the strategic location of Namibia and her administrative and economic dependency on South Africa. It invoked strong legal and juristic grounds to defend its position, contending that on the demise of the League, the Union of South Africa did not in fact transfer its powers with regard to the Namibian mandate to the United Nations; the Union was, and still is, *de jure* and *de facto* in possession of Namibia; the Union of South Africa did not consent by international agreement to surrender its rights to the United Nations; finally, as regards the administration of the territory, the Union owed no responsibility whatsoever to the United Nations or to any other international organization or body.<sup>5</sup>

### THE STATUS OF NAMIBIA?

South Africa's open defiance prompted the General Assembly to seek an opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the following issues: What is the international status of the territory of Namibia and what are the international obligations of the Union of South Africa? In particular: Does the Union of South Africa continue to have obligations under the mandate and if so, what are they? Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applicable to the territory of Namibia? Has the Union the competency to modify the international status of the Namibian mandate? In the event of a negative reply, where does competency lie to determine and modify the territory's status?<sup>6</sup>

With reference to the general question, the court held unanimously that Namibia was a territory under the international mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa on December 17, 1920. The panel of judges reasoned that the mandate system constituted a "sacred trust of civilization," "a new international institution with an international object," which did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty to South Africa. The Union government was simply empowered to exercise an international administrative function with the object of promoting the well-being and development of the inhabitants. Thus, the dissolution of the League of Nations did not alter the legal relationship between the mandated territory and the mandatory, since "the object of the mandate far exceeds that of a contrac-

tual relationship regulated by national law."<sup>7</sup> The authority assumed by South Africa was based on the mandate; if, as the Union government claimed, that had lapsed, then the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. "To retain the rights derived from the mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified."<sup>8</sup>

Having established a ruling on the international character of the mandate, the court addressed the first specific issue and declared that South Africa continued to have international obligations under the mandate and was obliged to submit reports and transmit petitions to the United Nations, which would exercise supervisory functions. Regarding the second question, the court unanimously agreed that Chapter XII of the Charter was applicable to Namibia, although by a vote of 8 to 6 it ruled that the provisions of Chapter XII did not impose a legal obligation on South Africa to place Namibia under the Trusteeship System. Finally, the panel of judges determined unanimously that the Union of South Africa, acting alone, did not have the competency to modify the international status of Namibia, inasmuch as this competency rested with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations.<sup>9</sup>

The 1950 advisory opinion was accepted by the General Assembly, which urged the Union of South Africa to comply with the decision of the International Court. Although initially willing to negotiate, South Africa stubbornly refused to submit reports or petitions to the ad hoc committee set up by the Assembly to oversee matters relating to implementation of the advisory opinion. The court's opinion was again sought in 1955 and 1956 in reference to voting procedures in the United Nations regarding reports and petitions on Namibia and the admissibility of oral petitions. On the first issue, the court supported the procedures adopted by the United Nations; on the second, it upheld the right of the committee to grant oral hearings to petitioners.

### THE JUDGMENTS OF 1962 AND 1966

Despite the various advisory opinions, the status of the Namibian mandate remained unchanged. South Africa refused to accept the court's decisions and hardly any action could be taken to force compliance. Meanwhile, Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of the League of Nations, were urged to institute contentious proceedings against South Africa. Accordingly, on November 4, 1960, these two countries filed charges against the Union government accusing South Africa of violating the welfare clauses of the mandate and of failing to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of Namibia.<sup>10</sup> In filing suit against South Africa, the applicants (Ethiopia and Liberia) hoped that the outcome of this case would legalize

<sup>5</sup> R. W. Imishue, *South West Africa* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders* (The Hague: 1950), p. 128.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

<sup>10</sup> *South West Africa Cases: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents*, 1966, p. 4.

the action of the United Nations and transform the Advisory Opinion of 1950 into judicially binding orders.

The government of South Africa responded to the charges by filing four preliminary objections contesting the jurisdiction of the court in this matter and the right of the applicants to institute contentious proceedings. It claimed specifically that the Namibian mandate was no longer a treaty in force; that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia had standing to sue; that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked material interest in the conflict; and that the alleged dispute was one which could "be settled by negotiation."<sup>11</sup>

The court rejected the arguments set forth by South Africa and held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case by finding that a "dispute" in fact existed, since the claims of the parties "relating to the performance of the obligations of the mandate are directly opposed to each other."<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the court ruled that the "mandate, in fact and in law [was] an international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention." The fact that it was referred to as a "declaration" was not significant compared to the character of the international agreement or undertaking.<sup>13</sup> Regarding the *locus standi* of the applicants to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, the judges held that "judicial protection of the sacred trust was an essential feature of the mandate system," which necessitated recourse to it "against possible abuse or breaches." And the right to implead the mandatory power, observed the court, was the best possible means to ensure that the purposes of the mandate were fulfilled, regardless of what might happen to the supervisory machinery."<sup>14</sup>

Having countered the preliminary objections of South Africa in its judgment of 1962, the court turned to an examination of the merits of the case. Unfortunately, this process was a lengthy one and the case was not finally disposed of until 1966. Over this span of years the composition of the court had changed, adversely affecting the final outcome.<sup>15</sup> In the judgment of 1962, the court had ruled that Liberia and Ethiopia possessed sufficient legal interest in the issue which warranted the judgment of the court. In 1966, however, the court reconsidered the issue of legal interest or standing of the applicants in

the "subject matter of their claim" and reversed its previous holding.

The 1966 judgment represented a flagrant travesty of justice. Prior practices<sup>16</sup> of the court as well as its own Statute and Rules acknowledged the well-established legal principles of *res judicata*, which for all practical purposes would require the court to be bound by its earlier pronouncements. Indeed, the reason for dismissal of the applicants' position lies elsewhere, in the "judicial conservatism" of the court and the fortuitous circumstances surrounding the lengthy proceedings. As Rosalyn Higgins stated:

It must be frankly acknowledged that the effective reversal has come about because a group of learned judges who were in the minority in 1962 (by 7 votes to 8) when the court determined its jurisdiction, now find themselves—for quite extraneous reasons—able to command a majority of votes.<sup>17</sup>

Although the Union of South Africa considered itself vindicated by the 1966 judgment, the general reaction to the court's decision was one of dismay. The General Assembly of the United Nations vehemently attacked the ruling and passed Resolution 2145, terminating South Africa's mandate over Namibia and transferring all administrative authority to the United Nations. South Africa, however, refused to acknowledge the validity of the General Assembly's action and continued to deny access to the territory to the United Nations Council, which had been established to administer Namibia. Simultaneously, the Union government instituted a series of repressive laws to perpetuate its apartheid policies.

Frustrated by the intransigence of South Africa, the General Assembly referred the issue to the Security Council, which adopted Resolutions 264 and 276. Resolution 264 recognized the General Assembly's termination of the mandate and declared that South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia constituted "an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations, a violation of [Namibia's] territorial integrity and a denial of political sovereignty to Namibia's people." Accordingly, it requested the South African government to withdraw from Namibia by October 5, 1969. South Africa's noncompliance prompted the passage of Resolution 276, holding that "the presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal" and that consequently all acts undertaken by South Africa "on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the mandate are illegal and invalid." Further, the Council called on "all states, particularly those which have economic and other interests in Namibia" to refrain from all dealings which would in any way support the continued presence of South Africa in the territory and thus impair the effectiveness of this resolution."<sup>18</sup>

South Africa responded negatively to the Security

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 197–198.

<sup>12</sup> I.C.J., *Reports*, 1962, p. 328.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

<sup>15</sup> L. C. Green, "South West Africa and the World Court," 22 *International Journal* 50 (1966).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* See *Corfu Channel and Asylum cases in I.C.J. Report* (1948), pp. 248, 266, 274.

<sup>17</sup> Rosalyn Higgins, "The International Court and South West Africa Cases: The Implications of the Judgment," 42 *International Affairs* 573 (1966).

<sup>18</sup> Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).



Council's request, whereupon the more firmly worded Resolution 283 was passed. Member states were asked to take action, including refraining from "any relations—diplomatic, consular or otherwise—with South Africa implying recognition of the authority of the South African Government over Namibia."<sup>19</sup> Despite this, South Africa openly defied the resolutions of the United Nations and cited the alleged illegality of Resolution 2145 as justification for its position. Accordingly, on July 29, 1970, the Security Council adopted Resolution 284, requesting an advisory opinion from the court on the following question: "What are the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)?"

### PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

As an *a priori* to ruling on the substantive merits, the court considered a number of preliminary objections raised by South Africa.

Most of the South African objections were predicated on the assumption that the Namibian problem was a "dispute." On the contrary, the court insisted there had never been a determination that a "dispute" existed. Discussions in the General Assembly and Security Council had always described the Namibian problem as a "situation." South Africa itself had acquiesced to such a characterization by its failure to raise any appropriate objection before the Security Council when Namibia was discussed as a "situation" and not as a "dispute." Thus the court reasoned that the Union government, "having failed to raise the question at the appropriate time in the appropriate forum," was now estopped "to raise it before the Court at this stage."<sup>20</sup> The court summarily dismissed all other objections raised by South Africa and proceeded to examine the substantive merits of the case.

### THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS

In ruling on the substantive merits, the court focused on three general issues, including judicial review, revocation of the mandate and the validity of General Assembly Resolution 2145 and Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).

Normally, the court does not have any specific authority to review the legality of specific acts undertaken by the political organs of the United Nations, although in an advisory opinion it may be asked to decide on the validity of particular actions. Thus,

when South Africa and France charged that in adopting Resolution 2145, the General Assembly had acted *ultra vires*,<sup>21</sup> the court was compelled to determine whether in fact it could assume the powers of judicial review of actions taken by other principal organs of the United Nations without being specifically requested to do so.

The court ruled affirmatively on this issue, but its holding was cloaked in halting and nebulous language. While acknowledging that it had no power to review resolutions, nevertheless the court agreed to pronounce on their legality. The court failed to resolve forthrightly its future power of judicial review and adopted instead a flexible approach from which it could either retreat or advance.<sup>22</sup>

### REVOCATION OF THE MANDATE

Having resolved the question of judicial review, the court examined the validity of General Assembly Resolution 2145 in terminating the mandate. It directed its inquiry first into whether the United Nations succeeded the supervisory functions of the League of Nations; second, whether the League had the power to revoke the mandate, and, if so, whether the United Nations had assumed this authority; and third, the court then ruled on the validity of the revocation of the mandate by the General Assembly.

On the issue of the transfer of supervision of the mandate, the court reaffirmed its previous decision, holding that the supervisory functions of the League of Nations were transferred to the United Nations upon the dissolution of the former body. The court reexamined at length whether the United Nations had succeeded the League, since such a finding was imperative to the resolution of revocability of the mandate. Relying heavily on the language and rationale of its prior holdings, the court rejected South Africa's claim that the revelation of "new facts" and the interpretation of Article 80 (1) of the Charter warranted a reversal of the court's 1950 opinion. The court predicated its decision on the objective underpinnings of the mandate, Articles 80 (1) and 10 of the Charter, and on the intention of League members prior to dissolution, including the relevant practices and statements of South Africa at that time.

The court focused next on the revocability of the mandate. Although it acknowledged the transfer of supervision from the League to the United Nations, that determination did not necessarily imply authority to revoke the mandate as well. Even if the United Nations could supervise the mandate, it could not exercise any powers exceeding those of the League.

The court approached this problem by applying international law principles governing the termination of treaties as a result of some material breach in the agreement. It reaffirmed its 1962 decision: the man-

<sup>19</sup> Security Council Resolution 284 (1970).

<sup>20</sup> I.C.J., Advisory Opinion (1971), pp. 22-23.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> A. Rovine, "The World Court Opinion on Namibia,"

11 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 203, at 217 (1972).

date "in fact and in law, is an international agreement having the character of a treaty convention."<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, the court held that the rules of the Vienna Convention were applicable to the mandate, justifying its termination on grounds of repudiation or violation of an essential provision. The fact that the mandate did not specifically include provisions for termination could not be interpreted as excluding this result due to breach. "Termination on account of breach must be presumed to exist in respect of all treaties,"<sup>24</sup> declared the court. Reemphasizing its 1966 decision, the court concluded that the mandate was revocable and that the United Nations possessed the necessary authority to do so.

### LEGALITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS' RESOLUTIONS

The court upheld the legality of the General Assembly's Resolution 2145 (1969), ruling that the failure of South Africa to submit to administrative supervision and render reports amounted to breaching the mandate and consequently justified termination. Although the General Assembly was invested with recommendatory powers only, this did not ultimately preclude it from "adopting in specific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative designs."<sup>25</sup>

The court also considered the question of apartheid, but this factor did not provide the dispositive rationale for its holding. It condemned South Africa's apartheid policy of separate development as contrary to human rights and fundamental freedoms and a "flagrant violation"<sup>26</sup> of the United Nations Charter. At the same time, it refused to base its opinion on the finding that apartheid constituted a breach of the mandate warranting its revocation. Despite apparent contradiction, the court upheld the validity of the General Assembly's action terminating the mandate. The next question dealt with the binding nature of Resolution 2145 as superimposed on the directives already included in Security Council Resolution 276.

The court examined the evolution of the Security Council's action within the relevant perspective of prior resolutions. It observed that, in adopting Resolution 2145, the General Assembly terminated the mandate but, "lacking the necessary powers" to compel South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, it sought assistance from the Security Council. The court upheld the legality of Resolution 276 on the basis of Article 24 of the Charter, which conferred

on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The specific provisions of Article 24, however, do not expressly authorize Resolution 276. And therefore, to justify its legality, the court indulged in a broad reading of the Charter, holding that its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security embraced the response to situations that might lead to a breach of the peace.

Resolution 276 was determined by the court to be binding on all member states by virtue of Article 25, which stipulated that the "members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." The court thus rejected South Africa's contention that Article 25 applied only to enforcement measures adopted under Articles 41 and 42. Because of the broad language of Article 25, the court restricted the full import of its interpretations to the particular conditions of each case or, "in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council."<sup>27</sup> The court did not posit any definitive standards for the dispositive criteria upon which the legal consequences for states could possibly be predicated. Rather, it concluded simply that Security Council Resolution 276 was binding on all members of the United Nations; it maintained that "to hold otherwise would be to deprive the main organ of its essential functions and powers under the Charter."<sup>28</sup>

### LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES

In considering the legal consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, the court noted that a "binding determination" by a competent body of the United Nations with respect to the illegality of a situation "cannot remain without consequences." Accordingly, it declared that United Nations members are obliged to bring the situation to an end. The court delivered a three-pronged decision directed first to the principal actor, South Africa, second to member states of the United Nations, and third to nonmember states.<sup>29</sup>

The operative sections of the court's opinion espoused the theory of nonrecognition of South Africa as the legitimate course of action. It is unfortunate that the court did not specify whether nonrecognition was based on the Security Council resolutions or on the fundamentals of international law. Some judges argued that the sanctionary aspects of the resolution were not legally binding; perhaps many states would subscribe to this view, regardless of the court's ruling. If such measures had been declared substantive ingredients of international law, flouting the ruling might have been more difficult. A further confusion dealt with the court's interpretation of the "invalidity

<sup>23</sup> Advisory Opinion (1971), p. 47.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 55-58.

of acts" concerning Namibia. The opinion considered official acts to be illegal but failed to define the precise acts permitted. Conceivably, nonofficial acts could be equally detrimental to the interests and welfare of Namibians. For instance, what is the obligation imposed on multinational corporations whose operations exploit the Namibian population and economy?

The court made bold assertions regarding the human rights provisions of the Charter. It is not at all clear from the opinion whether this was simply dictum or formed an element in the basic rationale of the court's opinion. Furthermore, in predicating its ruling on the narrow issue of rendering advice based on Resolution 276, the court failed to support the notion of military dislodgement against South Africa or to validate the actions of existing resistance movements.

### FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Although nearly four years have passed since the International Court of Justice rendered its landmark decision, the situation in Namibia remains unimproved. There are daily reports of mass intimidation and terror, police atrocities and torture, and increased repression through the "pass laws" and the mechanisms of a totalitarian state. South Africa has refused to accept the court's opinion and has indicated no real interest in a negotiated settlement. A brief period of dialogue and contact between the Union government and the United Nations Secretary General ended abruptly in 1973, when it became evident that such communications with the South African government were not only "unsatisfactory but also counter-productive."<sup>30</sup>

The United Nations, for its part, has engaged in an endless rhetoric of resolutions condemning South Africa and demanding its withdrawal from Namibia. Yet repeated efforts to secure more positive action by this body through the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa have been consistently vetoed by France, Great Britain and the United States.<sup>31</sup> Without the cooperation of the Security Council to invoke enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in support of the opinion of the International Court of Justice, it is doubtful that any present or future ruling by the court with regard to the status of Namibia would have any significant effect.

On a different level, however, there has been increasing activity by the Council on behalf of Namibia in the past few years. The Council has established an institute for the education and training of Namibians, enacted a decree on the natural resources of Namibia, and mounted a diplomatic onslaught against the apartheid regime of South Africa throughout Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>32</sup> As a result of the Council's efforts, the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) is recognized as the authentic representative of Namibia and has been granted associate membership in various United Nations organizations.

Important as these activities are, they do not resolve the basic issues concerning Namibia, nor do they affect the attitude to the court's opinion held by various states. Many countries still maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa and several Western nations, particularly the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany, continue to invest in Namibia through various multinational corporations.<sup>33</sup> According to the Special Committee of 24, "Foreign monopolies . . . follow economic and financial policies detrimental to [Namibia] as high profits are either taken out or remain in the hands of the exploitative minority of foreign settlers."<sup>34</sup>

### AN UNEASY PEACE

Thus, while the court opinion of 1971 does mark bold advances in the jurisprudence of the court, nevertheless an evaluation of its impact leaves much to be desired for the rule of law in the resolution of the Namibian dispute. The opinion lacks authority; enforcement measures by the Security Council are not now foreseeable. In her article, "American Responsibilities Towards Namibia," Elizabeth Landis emphasized the special obligations of the United States to conform to the opinion.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, it is the obligation of all states to make the court's ruling effective.

But unfortunately, in the realm of politics, the practice and the ideal are not identical. Barring a commitment by the major Western powers, as well as by the Security Council of the United Nations, a non-violent transition in Namibia is not now conceivable. Namibia dangles in an uneasy peace, and the failure to resolve the issue through legal means and political negotiation invites a plunge into the harsh realities of armed confrontation and guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa.

<sup>30</sup> United Nations, *A Trust Betrayed: Namibia*, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>32</sup> United Nations Office of Public Information, Press Release, February 11, 1975.

<sup>33</sup> See *Report of U. N.*, op. cit., pp. 40-47, for background of various multinational corporations.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, *A Trust Betrayed*, op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>35</sup> Elizabeth Landis, "American Responsibilities Towards Namibia: Law and Policy," *Africa Today*, vol. 18, 1971, pp. 38-48.

Motee Persaud has just completed a Ph.D. degree at the School of International Service, American University, and a J.D. degree at the National Law Center of George Washington University. He has been a Visiting Professor of Sociology at Georgetown University and a Guest Lecturer in International Relations at American University.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### ON AFRICA

**GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1943-1970.** BY KENNETH A. HEARD. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 269 pages, notes and index, \$18.25.)

This book covers the period when the party espousing National Afrikanerdom established its political rule in South Africa. The elections of 1943 confirmed the actions of the government of General Jan Smuts, who had abandoned neutrality and sided with Great Britain in World War II. After 1943, the United party was able to maintain a coalition government.

But after the 1943 elections, the growing nationalistic sentiments of the white Afrikaners (approximately 58 percent of the voters) characterized the South African government; by 1960, a national referendum indicated that South Africans wanted to establish a republic and, by 1961, to leave the British Commonwealth. South Africa became the Republic of South Africa in May, 1961. Since 1961, Afrikaners, the majority of the electorate, have become even more firmly entrenched.

### HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA. VOLUME II.

EDITED BY J. F. ADE AJAYI AND MICHAEL CROWDER. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 764 pages, illustrations and index, \$20.00, cloth; \$10.00, paper.)

In this volume, the editors continue their history of West Africa after 1800. The essays describe the history of West African countries from the days of the slave trade, through the establishment of colonial rule, to the creation of the new independent states of West Africa. Volume I dealt with West Africa before 1800.

**THE BANTU CIVILIZATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.** BY E. JEFFERSON MURPHY. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1974. 273 pages, maps, illustrations, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

E. Jefferson Murphy writes an excellent account of the history of the Bantu-speaking tribes of southern Africa. Almost the whole African continent below the equator is peopled by Bantu-speaking people, who have common ties of language, culture and history. Their past is rich in memories of highly organized kingdoms and empires, great achievements in the arts and in agriculture, and skill in the mining, working and fashioning of implements made from a large variety of metals.

**THE HORN OF AFRICA.** BY J. BOWYER BELL, JR. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974. 55 pages and bibliography, \$4.95.)

The Horn of Africa is strategically important because of its geographical position "abutting the vital oil routes out of the Arabian Sea, and also because of the developing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean." Bell focuses on the present and future significance of the area and on the political stresses developing there.

**ISLAM IN UGANDA.** BY ARYE ODED. (New York: Halstead Press, 1974. 381 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$23.50.)

The author analyzes the manner in which Uganda became subject to the forces of Islamization during the nineteenth century. Islam has strongly influenced Uganda's subsequent political history.

**AFRIKANER POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1934-1948.** BY NEWELL M. STULTZ. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 200 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$8.00.)

Stultz writes an interesting account of the period from 1934, when English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites cooperated politically, to the victory of Afrikaner nationalists in 1948, which helped strengthen the apartheid policies of South Africa and ended cooperation between English-speaking whites and the newly dominant Afrikaners.

**DANCE AND SOCIETY IN EASTERN AFRICA, 1890-1970.** BY T. O. RANGER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 175 pages, appendix and index, \$10.00.)

The author examines the history of East African popular culture by describing the diffusion of the Beni dance mode from the Kenyan coast in the 1890's, along the coast, and inland into East Africa. By relating the spread of the dance form to historical crises in East African history, Ranger shows the reactions of the inarticulate masses.

**HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA.** BY WALTER RODNEY. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974. 288 pages, \$10.50.)

Rodney believes that Europeans, in the slave trade and in their colonization policies, have always economically underdeveloped Africa. He thinks that more complete development must be accomplished by Africans alone.



**URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE, THE POLITICS OF LAGOS, 1917-1967.** By PAULINE H. BAKER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 384 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$18.50.)

Baker, a resident of Lagos for nine years, analyzes the impact of urbanization on Lagos, Nigeria, during the period when it grew from a colonial town of 100,000 people to a city of more than one and one-quarter million inhabitants. Lagos is tropical Africa's largest city.

**NIGERIA, OPTIONS FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT.** By THE WORLD BANK AND WOUTER TIMMS (COORDINATING AUTHOR). (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. 256 pages and maps, \$12.00, cloth; \$6.00, paper.)

This World Bank report reviews the major economic policies and trends in Nigeria during 1972-1973, with an estimate of long-term prospects through the early 1980's. The report is useful for the scholar, with its detailed economic reports, graphs and projections; it should be a valuable reference for the average student who needs accurate information about Nigerian economic history and prospects.

**GOVERNING AN AFRICAN CITY, A STUDY OF NAIROBI.** By HERBERT H. WERLIN. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1974. 308 pages, notes and index, \$22.50.)

Nairobi is probably the most important city, with the most complex government organization, in East Africa. Werlin details the political and social problems faced by the Kenyan government as it took over the administration of the city.

**PILLARS IN ETHIOPIAN HISTORY.** EDITED BY JOSEPH E. HARRIS. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974. 154 pages and bibliography, \$8.95.)

Harris has edited four essays on Ethiopian history that were delivered by William Hansberry, the founder of the African studies program at Howard University. The focus is on the ancient and medieval history of Ethiopia.

**NIGERIAN MODERNIZATION, THE COLONIAL LEGACY.** By UKANDI G. DAMACHI. (New York: The Third Press, 1974. 145 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$7.95.)

Nigeria is now undergoing increasingly rapid industrialization and urbanization. Damachi analyzes the effects of colonialism on Nigeria's past and the manner in which the past is affecting the future of the 66 million people of Nigeria, the largest black population in the world. This is a much easier source of material for the student than the World Bank report and gives additional historical and sociological information as well.

**SLAVERY, COLONIALISM AND RACISM.** EDITED BY SIDNEY W. MINTZ. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1975. 213 pages, references, notes and index, \$10.95.)

Mintz has selected essays by twelve specialists who examine the historical and contemporary experience of black people in Africa and the Americas. The essays cover slavery, colonialism and imperialism, race relations and an exploration of more recent trends in these areas. It is Mintz's thesis, as borne out by the selected essays, that the black experience cannot be fully appreciated unless it is viewed in the context of a global society.

**BATTLE FOR THE BUNDU.** By CHARLES MILLER. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. 353 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.95.)

Charles Miller has written an interesting account of an important (at the time) segment of history in East Africa. The importance of the war in East Africa to the larger World War I lay in the fact that a relatively small German force, largely made up of native troops, was able to hold off a 250,000-British force for more than four years. The British troops were needed on European battlefields; and the British force committed to this African operation undoubtedly slowed down the timetable for Allied victory in Europe.

**FOURTH SHORE, THE ITALIAN COLONIZATION OF LIBYA.** By CLAUDIO G. SEGRÉ. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975. 237 pages, bibliographical essay and index, \$15.00.)

Segré has written an excellent study of imperialism in northern Africa. Italy conquered the Turkish colony of Libya in 1911 and proceeded to colonize the country. Until the arrival of fascism in Italy in the 1930's, colonialism was slow; in the 1930's thousands of Italians emigrated to live in Libya, where the original natives became second-class citizens. The Italian experiment failed when the support of the mother country was withdrawn.

**CATHOLICS, PEASANTS AND CHEWA RESISTANCE IN NYASALAND.** By IAN LINDEN. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. 233 pages, illustrations, maps, tables and index, \$16.00.)

The British Protectorate of Nyasaland, now Malawi, was the scene of intense missionary rivalry between Catholic and Protestant denominations. Linden has written an extended case study of Catholicism as an aspect of colonialism in Central Africa. In particular, he writes of the three-quarters of a million Catholics among Malawi's four million population who are largely subsistence farmers and have always been of a conservative bent, politically and intellectually. ■

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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### The United Nations Resolution on Namibia

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on December 17, 1974, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Security Council that day.*

#### STATEMENT BY U.S. AMBASSADOR SCALI

U.N. concern over the South African administration of Namibia spans the life of this organization. For the seventh consecutive year, the Security Council is considering this same question of Namibia. Since the Security Council met last December to discuss the future of Namibia, we are all aware that political developments of great importance to Namibia and the rest of southern Africa have taken place.

The April [1974] events in Portugal have irrevocably altered the political map of southern Africa. These events have set in motion a continuing and dramatic movement toward full decolonization in Portuguese Africa. More recently, meetings held in Zambia involving the various political forces on the Rhodesian scene have raised hopes that a solution to the Rhodesian issue acceptable to a majority of the people may soon be negotiated. These developments, we believe, must necessarily impel South Africa to reexamine its basic policies regarding Namibia in light of the new realities.

The position of my government on the Namibian question is clear and unequivocal. We have informed the government of South Africa of our views on this issue and will continue to do so when appropriate. We believe that there is an urgent need to resolve this longstanding and contentious issue peacefully and as soon as possible.

We are encouraged by recent indications that South Africa may be reviewing its policies in Namibia. The South African government has announced that the people of Namibia will be called upon to decide their own future, that all options including full independence are open to them, and that the people of the territory may exercise their right to self-determination "considerably sooner" than the 10-year forecast made by the South African foreign minister in 1973.

We believe that a peaceful and realistic solution should be sought now. We understand that a meeting is planned between representatives of various groups in the territory and the leaders of the white population to discuss the constitutional development of the territory. We believe no significant element of the Namibian people or of Namibian political life should be excluded.

However, as much as we welcome the changes in recent South African government statements on Namibia, we wish to state in all candor our view that these statements lack necessary precision and detail. It is this very precision, along with positive actions, which is required to lay to rest the skepticism with which South African pronounce-

ments on Namibia have been received in many quarters. What is called for is a specific, unequivocal statement of South Africa's intention with regard to the territory. We urge that government to make known as soon as possible its plans to permit the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination in the near future.

We further favor the development of renewed contacts between the Secretary General and the South African government to assist South Africa in arranging for the exercise of self-determination. The constructive involvement of the United Nations and the Secretary General can be of significant importance to assure an orderly transition of power in the territory, which is to everyone's benefit. We also believe South Africa should abolish discriminatory laws and practices and encourage freer political expression within the whole territory.

While awaiting further South African clarification of its Namibian policy, the United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with regard to the territory. As we have since 1970, we will continue to discourage United States investment in Namibia and deny Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. We will continue to withhold United States government protection of United States investments, made on the basis of rights acquired through the South African government after 1966, against the claims of a future lawful government of Namibia. This policy reflects our belief that South Africa should act quickly and positively to end its illegal occupation of Namibia.

In addition, we are pleased that we were able to join together in advance consultations with members of the African group to adopt this important new resolution.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974,

*Recalling* Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971 and 310 (1972) of 4

*(Continued on page 232)*

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/RES/366 (1974); adopted by the Council unanimously on December 17, 1974.

## AFRICAN UNITY TWELVE YEARS LATER

*(Continued from page 196)*

man's historic struggle for human dignity and self-realization." But the role of the OAU in attaining those goals has not yet become clear. The OAU has achieved its presence; it survives despite the diversity of African economic systems, political institutions, customs, wealth, and modes of expression. But it need no longer prove it can survive—instead, it now has the opportunity to translate its ideals into concrete policies. ■

## END OF AN EMPIRE

*(Continued from page 215)*

settlers make it unlikely that Angola will have a revolutionary government similar to those in control in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, with her large settler population (350,000 whites against 6 million Africans), her history of bloody racial violence and the absence of a broadly based national movement, Angola could produce an explosive transition from Lisbon's rule.

Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau will probably continue to move along a socialist path similar to that of Tanzania. Agriculture will be of prime importance in their development. Both FRELIMO and PAIGC announced long ago the goal of stamping out the exploitation of the African peasantry, by colonialism or by traditional chiefs. Their fledgling efforts in the liberated zones during the fighting point to a determination to provide electricity, running water, education, health care and roads to their people as soon as possible. Unless subverted by powerful internal forces or by external interests, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau should evolve socialist governments.

One likely source of opposition is the settler community in Mozambique. Some, but not all, Europeans are unhappy about the lost connection with Lisbon and fear an African-controlled government. Another source of uncertainty is the far more mysterious factor in all three territories—the African soldier of the former Portuguese army.<sup>7</sup> African manpower, which comprised 60 percent of the army militia, police and fire brigades, is of sufficient number and discipline to be a decisive factor in political decisions. Since the early nineteenth century, Portugal's army has intervened to decide the fate of five regimes. Will a similar pattern emerge in the former Portuguese colonies?

For students of revolution and nationalism these

former colonies raise interesting questions. Can the revolutionary leadership escape the inefficiency, corruption and elitism of the colonial rulers and the governments of some of the former French and British territories? Will the new governments succeed in hammering out an authentic national culture? Or will the leaders look toward Portugal (which of all the colonial powers preached a civilizing mission) to copy what the Portuguese tried to transplant for over 400 years?

Much will depend not only on the policies of the new governments but also on the extent to which they are wooed by East and West. Angola's bountiful riches make her an attractive prize; she could become an African "Vietnam," with protracted conflict, or a "Brazil," with racial mixing and potential prosperity. With fewer resources, Mozambique will be courted for her strategic location along the oil lanes to the Persian Gulf and her several large ports on the eastern shores of the Indian Ocean.

Whatever the future, southern Africa will continue to live up to the prophecy of the ancient Greeks, who held that there is always something new out of Africa. ■

## NIGERIA

*(Continued from page 219)*

The questions facing Nigeria in 1975 are whether the turbulence can be controlled, and if so, how? Of the four most realistic possibilities, two are more hopeful and two less so.

One possibility is that there will be a progressive return to elected and representative civilian government. In announcing the continuation of military rule, General Gowon spoke of adding new councils for the federal and state governments, through which a cross section of the public would advise on policy; these bodies could be a means for associating people with a genuine popular backing with government. In the meantime, the military government may revise state boundaries and subdivide certain of the larger states of the federation—although experience with the creation of the existing states shows how long it takes to turn a geographical expression into an active state of the federation. The military government may also proceed with a constitutional convention in late 1976, the commitment to which it has yet to disavow explicitly. In the meantime, the government may remain an amalgam of constitutional government and military autocracy, maintaining a degree of order and allowing Nigerian enterprise to sustain the boom economy.

In practice, an ordered return to civilian rule appears less likely than continued military rule. The military, having removed the obstacle of a long-standing commitment to a return of civilian rule, appear well settled in their positions of power, and

<sup>7</sup> For fuller treatment of this viewpoint, see Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa," paper read at the African Studies Association annual meeting, Chicago, November 1, 1974.

even if General Gowon is sincerely committed to the restoration of civilian government, there are others who want to retain their power. The present form of constitutional government directed by military autocrats may well survive in these circumstances for a considerable time. The military may retain a necessary degree of cohesion in the face of other interests in the society; at the same time there may be continued, and possibly increased, access for these interests so that government remains responsive, not only to pressures from the military and police, but to a wide range of interests.

One danger is the possibility that the current form of constitutional and limited government may give way to an increasingly repressive military dictatorship. Military rule is not popular—as successive riots in the country's universities and strikes in the public service at the beginning of 1975 have made clear—and repression may seem an attractive alternative to conciliation. If military government became actively distrusted, as it would be for instance in much of southern Nigeria if the Federal Military Council were suspected of being under the control of officers from the far north, it might be difficult to avoid a spiral of increasing repression.

Equally damaging for the country would be a situation in which the army and public service were progressively attached to outside political interests. Until October, 1974, much political activity was held in check pending the legitimation of political activity. To an increasing degree, Nigerian political skills are being directed to further colonizing the military and civil service. In the process, the suspicions and divisions that characterized it in 1965 and 1966 could be recreated.

Regardless of the direction of the political order in Nigeria, the federal and state governments seem likely to face more difficult conditions in the immediate future than they faced in the recent past. Intractable problems have accumulated, and they must be handled by military governments with declining public support, and with a revenue from oil which, although enormous, is no longer increasing in amount at the rate that it increased each year since 1970. However, as long as the government can contain within bounds the turbulence of Nigerian political life, and can maintain the degree of order that it has achieved in the past five years, the country can look forward to further advances. Whether in the foreseeable future there will be a restoration of the democratic political rights to which many Nigerians are attached is distinctly more problematical. ■

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## EAST AFRICA

*(Continued from page 205)*

southward. Relations between Tanzania and Zambia are generally cordial. Zambia has modeled many

political and economic changes on Tanzania, and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is a close friend of Nyerere's. Moreover, the Tan-Zam (officially the Tazara) railway between the two countries is being completed rapidly, and when it is finished it will strengthen economic ties between the two states. If Tanzania and Zambia move to establish a common market and a system of joint services, Zaire might be a potential third member.

Tanzania has also taken a greater interest than Kenya or Uganda in liberation movements in southern Africa. Thus, Portugal's moves away from colonialism have great significance for Tanzania's position on the continent. If the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) comes to power in Mozambique, Tanzania will have another potential ally on her southern border.

Although unexpected developments may preserve East African cooperation along traditional lines, it seems probable that the differences in policies, new patterns of trade, and the nationalism of the three partners will continue to separate them. ■

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## REVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA

*(Continued from page 210)*

Israel. Arab support of Eritrea may not be concerted, but it seems nearly unanimous.

To the Ethiopian government, this represents unacceptable interference in its domestic affairs as a sovereign state. An independent Eritrea could mean the loss of Ethiopia's outlet to the sea (the railroad from Addis to Djibouti ends in foreign territory, and the French can be expected to continue their pro-Arab policies). The issue consequently struck at the very heart of Ethiopia and, in this sense, the regime was fighting for its survival as well as for the unity of the country. Moreover, as the fighting continued, more Eritreans sided with the guerrillas against the "Amhara," as they called the central government. Eritreans were under enormous stress, many of them defecting openly to the liberation forces. The defection of highly trained police commandos, and the many Eritreans in the navy and air force, could pose serious problems in an atmosphere conditioned by open fighting, troop massacres, and exacerbated ethnic differences. Increasingly, Eritreans felt that they were fighting as a separate former European colony to liberate themselves from neo-imperialist occupation.

The Eritrean problem is the result of past Addis high-handedness and insensitivity; a nonmilitary solution is closely related to the emerging new Ethiopian political system. If significant national minorities, however structured, cannot be forced into submission, then the government's only alternative is to give them greater opportunities: to use their skills



and drive; and allow all groups to participate in shaping their country's future by involving them directly in building new institutions and reordering priorities. The new civilian and military forces in Ethiopia have an opportunity to lay the foundations of a more democratic and less friable regime. The transition period is not likely to be smooth, and will tax the resources of a proud and capable people. Regarding Eritrea, it is difficult to conceive prolonged resistance to a political solution involving concessions on both sides and resulting in substantial provincial autonomy. With respect to other pressing domestic challenges, the military leaders' ability to elaborate and implement plans to solve common economic, social, and political problems remains to be demonstrated.

### U.S. POLICY


Recent United States policy toward Ethiopia illustrates a classic dilemma in foreign affairs: an external situation is unpredictable, involves undesirable and possibly painful risks, and therefore invites minimal responses. In this case, there were tensions between fluid and unforeseen short-term events, on the one hand, and Ethiopia's decreasing importance and yet escalating demands for more arms, on the other. Because "success" was elusive, policy decisions sought to minimize risks.

For a number of reasons, political and strategic considerations would on balance seem to counsel United States restraint. The Organization of African Unity, following its penchant for warding off extra-African pressures and its paramount concern for the territorial integrity of member states, did not officially insert itself into the Ethiopian civil war, thus indicating its preference that the United States avoid drastic initiative. Significant American involvement could also incur Arab hostility. To be sure, Arab countries feel free to support the Eritreans, and prospects for an immediate oil embargo against the United States over this issue seem remote. But the political implications of substantial American military aid could conceivably undercut United States diplomatic moves in the Middle East, trigger increased involvement by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and provide another rallying point against the machinations of "imperialism."


It was also true that the new Ethiopian government's ability to secure a military victory was in doubt, even with American aid; that government was fighting for its life and for the survival of Ethiopia. Given these conditions, close American identification was a gamble, the eventual wisdom of which was difficult to discern.

No doubt such considerations were reflected in the vacillations of American policy. Emperor Haile Selassie sought several hundred million dollars worth

### U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE (PL 480) TO ETHIOPIA



### EMERGENCY NONFOOD ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA FISCAL YEAR 1974



Source: Department of State Publication 8792, African Series 58, October, 1974.

of arms during his May, 1973, visit to the United States, and was turned down on the grounds that the Somali threat was exaggerated. Arms deliveries were  
(Continued on page 240)

## U.N. RESOLUTION

(Continued from page 228)

February 1972, which confirmed General Assembly decisions, *Recalling* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

*Concerned* about South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

*Gravely concerned* at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia,

1. *Condemns* the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;

2. *Condemns* the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;

3. *Demands* that South Africa make a solemn declaration that it will comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and that it recognizes the territorial integrity and unity

of Namibia as a nation, such declaration to be addressed to the Security Council of the United Nations;

4. *Demands* that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

5. *Demands* further that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 30 May 1975 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.

## U.S. Objection to U.N. Ruling on South Africa

*On November 12, 1974, U.S. Representative to the U.N. John Scali clarified the objections of the United States to the U.N. ruling excluding South Africa from participation in the General Assembly. Excerpts follow:*

My delegation cannot accept the argument that the vote in the Security Council on the South African issue last October 30 in any way changes the clear wording of articles 5 and 6 of the charter. Nor, in our view, does it in any way permit this or any other Assembly to deprive a member of the rights and privileges of membership.

I am deeply concerned with the criticism of my delegation's vote in the Security Council on the South African matter. I categorically reject any implication that our vote was anti-African, anti-United Nations, or was motivated by any support whatsoever for apartheid.

As I had hoped was clear from the many times my delegation has expressed this view, the U.S. government thoroughly opposes the policy of apartheid. We support the self-determination as soon as possible of Namibia. We call on South Africa to fulfill its obligations under article 25 of the charter and to comply with Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

Has it been forgotten that the United States imposed its own arms embargo on South Africa before the United Nations did?

As I said in my explanation of [the] vote before the Security Council last October 30, Mr. President [Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika]:

My delegation believes that South Africa should continue to be exposed, over and over again, to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid. South Africans could hear of this abhorrence only from afar were we to cast them from our ranks, beyond the range of our voices.

Our analysis is that expulsion would say to the most hardened racist elements in South Africa that their indifference to our words and resolutions had been justified. We think it would say to the South Africans that we have not heard, or do not wish to encourage, the new voices—the voices that augur hope of change.

We believe that the United Nations must continue its pressure upon South Africa, moving step by step until right has triumphed. It is self-defeating to fire a single last dramatic salvo with only silence to follow. History holds no example of a pariah state that reformed itself in exile. The pariah is by definition an outlaw, free of restraint. There is no record of good citizenship in the land of Nod, east of Eden, where Cain, the first pariah, was banished.

My delegation has another grave concern about the wisdom of expelling South Africa. Even if this would help thwart the ugly crime of apartheid, expulsion would set a shattering precedent which could gravely damage the U.N.

Mr. President, my delegation further believes that the expulsion of South Africa would reverse the evolution of the United Nations toward ever wider membership.

These were our reasons and our only reasons. We hold them no less deeply than those who hold a different view. We respect that different view, and we expect no less in return. We also expect that the clear words of the charter will be honored. This Assembly may be master of its procedures, but not of our charter, which remains the paramount document of our existence as an organization based on law.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of March, 1975, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### European Economic Community (EEC)

Mar. 4—The foreign ministers of the 9 European Common Market (EEC) members agree on a fund (to become operational later this year) of \$1.4 billion, which is to be distributed over the next 3 years to poorer regions of the EEC, like southern Italy, northern Britain and Ireland.

Mar. 11—Concluding 2 days of meetings in Dublin, Ireland, the heads of government of the EEC countries renegotiate the terms of Britain's membership, providing for lower British budget payments. The members also agree to set up a committee to summarize their views on a common policy toward OPEC.

### French-Speaking African Conference

Mar. 9—Speaking at the conclusion of a 3-day conference of 14 French-speaking African countries in Bangui, Central African Republic, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing says that he hopes the Portuguese-speaking African countries will be represented at the meeting of the group in Paris in 1976; the conference has called for more development aid and better trading terms for raw resources exporters.

### General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Mar. 4—The 90 countries attending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) conference in Geneva agree to negotiate nontariff barriers to trade, including labeling requirements, health and safety standards, and quotas.

### International Energy Agency

Mar. 7—After 2 days of meetings in Paris, the 18 members of the International Energy Agency (oil-consuming countries) agree on common grounds for talks with the 13 member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); representatives are scheduled to meet in Paris on April 7 to make preliminary plans for a world energy conference.

### Middle East

Mar. 6—A small group of Arab guerrillas land from 2 small boats along the Tel Aviv, Israel, waterfront; they take a number of hostages and seize control of the Savoy Hotel. Israeli soldiers surround the hotel and exchange shots with the raiders.

Mar. 7—With the discovery of 5 more bodies in the wreckage of the Savoy Hotel, the toll of dead reaches 18; this includes 7 of the 8 Arab raiders.

Mar. 8—Bahrainian Foreign Minister Sheik Mohammed bin Mubarak says that the attitude of the U.S. toward the Arabs in the Middle East will determine whether the U.S. can continue to use its Bahrain naval base and port facilities, which give the U.S. Navy access to the Persian Gulf.

Mar. 19—The Egyptian government's chief spokesman, Tahsin Basir, reaffirms Egypt's willingness to negotiate an end to the state of war between Egypt and Israel within

the limits of any final settlement of the conflict that accords with the United Nations Security Council resolutions; informed officials note the distinction between a formal and an informal termination of a state of war.

Mar. 21—Leaders of the Palestinian National Assembly and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad agree to form united military and political commands.

Mar. 29—In a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly, President Anwar Sadat announces that he will open the Suez Canal to international shipping June 5.

He also renews permission unconditionally for the presence of the U.N. forces in the Sinai for 3 more months.

Mar. 30—Egypt places restrictions on cargo ships using the canal to carry cargo bound for Israel. Israeli ships are forbidden to use the canal.

### Organization for Economic Cooperation (OEC)

Mar. 18—Meeting in Paris, the 24 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation agree to establish a \$25 billion fund from which member countries may borrow if they are in financial difficulties because of high oil prices. The agreement is expected to be signed by OEC members on April 9 in Paris and must be ratified by the members' appropriate legislative bodies.

### Persian Gulf Dispute

Mar. 1—Hijackers demanding \$5 million and the release of Kurdish rebel leaders are attacked by Iraqi security forces on an Iraqi Airlines Boeing 737 at Teheran airport. One hijacker and 2 passengers are killed. The 2 other hijackers are arrested in the terminal building.

Mar. 6—In Algiers, Algerian President Houari Boumedienne announces that the Shah of Iran and the Deputy Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Hussein, have agreed to settle their border dispute.

Mar. 9—*The New York Times* reports a new Iraqi offensive against the rebel Kurds in northern Iraq. Iran has agreed to stop providing the rebels with arms and ammunition.

Mar. 14—The Iraqi government announces a 2-week cease-fire in its war against the Kurds, beginning March 13.

The Iranian government offers the Kurdish rebels sanctuary if they cross the border into Iran.

Mar. 17—In Teheran, Iran and Iraq reach an agreement on their mutual border; Iran will be responsible for curtailing infiltrations across her border.

Mar. 19—According to the Iraqi press agency, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council has refused a Kurdish offer to negotiate a cease-fire.

Mar. 22—General Mustafa Barzani, Kurdish rebel leader, declares that the fighting is over because his revolt has no foreign support.

Mar. 23—Thousands of Iraqi Kurds are reportedly crossing the border into Iran to the refugee camps set up by the Iranian government.

Mar. 31—Iraqi government troops are ordered to seize Kurdistan.



### United Nations

Mar. 12—15 members of the United Nations Security Council approve a resolution calling on Greek and Turkish Cypriotes to resume negotiations for a political settlement on Cyprus under the aegis of U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

Mar. 15—About 100 members of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) meet in Paris to try to find a way to lift the UNESCO ban on Israeli participation in its work.

Mar. 17—In Geneva, delegates from about 140 nations start an 8-week session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas, which adjourned after meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, in the summer of 1974.

Mar. 28—United Nations sources report that U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has advised U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Cambodian insurgent leader-in-exile, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has turned down his offer to act as mediator between the insurgents and the Cambodian government.

### War in Indochina

(See also *Intl. U.N.*; *Thailand*; *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

#### CAMBODIA

Mar. 3—Cambodian rebels fire rockets on Phnom Penh and Pochentong Airport, killing 19 and wounding 25.

Mar. 5—For the first time since the January 1 offensive began, Cambodian rebels use captured American-made 105 mm. guns in the latest shelling of the airport. An American DC-8 has been slightly damaged by shrapnel in the shelling.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger warns that the U.S. will have to reevaluate its emergency airlift if the Cambodian government is unable to protect the Pochentong Airport.

Mar. 7—Cambodian military sources reveal that the beachhead known as Sierra II, the government's last beachhead on the lower Mekong River, was evacuated last night.

Mar. 8—It is reported from Phnom Penh that two key commanders have been replaced by younger military officers.

Mar. 14—In Paris, representatives of the rebels declare that their Communist officers dominate 97 percent of Cambodia, ruling 6 million of the 7.5 million Cambodians.

Mar. 17—International relief personnel begin to leave Phnom Penh under the auspices of the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh.

Mar. 19—After breaking through government-held lines, insurgent troops take up positions 2 miles east of Phnom Penh.

Mar. 20—The British embassy in Phnom Penh begins to evacuate its staff.


Mar. 23—A U.S. embassy official reveals that the U.S. airlift into Phnom Penh has been halted indefinitely "until the military situation near the airport improves." Yesterday rebels scored a direct hit on airlift planes, hitting a DC-8 jet and a Bird Air C-130.

Mar. 25—In a "calculated gamble," the U.S. airlift into Phnom Penh resumes.

Mar. 30—Government officials reveal that President Lon Nol plans to leave the country April 1 to visit in Indonesia. He is not expected to return to Cambodia.

#### VIETNAMESE CONFLICT

Mar. 9—Thuan Man, a district capital of Phu Bon Province, is surrendered to North Vietnamese troops.



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### SOUTH VIETNAM, April 1, 1975

Mar. 14—North Vietnamese forces conquer almost all of the city of Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province.

Mar. 18—Western sources in Saigon report that after 14 days of fighting the Saigon government is abandoning most of the Central Highlands, including the key provinces of Darlac, Pleiku and Kontum.

Mar. 19—It is estimated in Saigon that some 100,000 refugees are fleeing from the Central Highlands to the coast. Some estimates place the refugee total as high as half a million people in 5 provinces, including Quang Tri and Thua Thien, South Vietnam's northernmost provinces.

Mar. 22—Saigon reports the loss of a base camp at Duc Hue, 40 miles west of Saigon, as intensive fighting continues near Saigon.

A Saigon government spokesman reports that the government has lost contact with Gia Nghia, the capital of Quang Duc Province; Khanh Duong, the capital of Khanh Hoa Province, is also reported lost.

Mar. 23—It is reported that the rebels have cut all overland routes from Hue, the capital of the northern province of Thua Thien. Refugees continue to stream toward Da Nang, the 2d largest city in Vietnam.



Mar. 26—Saigon forces withdraw from Hue; Da Nang's security is threatened.

The U.S. State Department reports that U.S. planes will airlift some 100,000 people daily from Da Nang to Cam Ranh, 250 miles south of Da Nang.

Mar. 27—Meeting in Saigon under the leadership of former South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, opposition politicians urge South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to "turn over full powers to a new government" that would be able to save the nation from the on-rushing Communists.

Mar. 28—According to reliable sources in Saigon, more than \$1 billion in American-supplied arms and equipment has been abandoned by retreating South Vietnamese forces in the last week.

Mar. 29—North Vietnamese soldiers overrun Bao Loc, the capital of Lam Dong Province, 93 miles northeast of Saigon.

Mar. 30—South Vietnamese Deputy Premier Phan Quang Dan tells a news conference that Da Nang is lost.

Mar. 31—Da Nang is occupied by North Vietnamese troops as South Vietnamese forces flee. The coastal city of Nha Trang is endangered. Fears of an attack on Saigon intensify.

A Hanoi radio broadcast says the Vietcong are ready to confer with a South Vietnamese government excluding President Thieu.

### ARGENTINA

Mar. 4—The peso is devalued 50 percent by the government; the official rate of exchange is now 15 pesos to one U.S. dollar. This is the first devaluation since President Isabel Martinez de Perón took office in May, 1973.

Mar. 20—The Ministry of the Interior announces that the government has successfully broken up a left-wing plot to disrupt industrial production in the north.

Mar. 22—8 more victims of political violence are found, bringing the death toll because of political terrorism to 24 during the last 3 days.

Workers in the north continue to strike in protest against the government's arrest of union leaders on March 20.

### BRAZIL

Mar. 1—In a state of the nation message to Congress, President General Ernesto Geisel declares that internal terrorism has been brought under control and that the country can turn its attention to economic and social development.

Mar. 5—In São Paulo, the political police charge that the opposition majority leader in the state assembly was elected with the help of the illegal Communist party.

Mar. 6—The Brazilian Democratic Movement, the only legal opposition party, petitions Minister of Justice Armando Ribeiro Falcão to provide information on the whereabouts of missing political prisoners.

### BURMA

Mar. 21—The military announces that on March 15 government forces defeated Communists rebels in the Pégú Yoma hills.

### CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Mar. 11—President Lon Nol asks Premier Long Boret to form a new Cabinet; he also dismisses General Sosthené Fernandez, commander of the armed forces.

Mar. 21—Boret announces a new Cabinet, with few changes. Hang Thun Hak is the new first deputy premier.

### CANADA

Mar. 26—A strict interpretation of the 1969 abortion law is upheld by the Supreme Court in a 6 to 3 vote.

### CHILE

Mar. 2—Defense Minister General Oscar Bonilla and 6 other people are killed in a helicopter crash.

### CHINA

Mar. 1—In an apparent change of attitude toward the Chinese Nationalist government of President Chiang Kai-shek, Liao Cheng-Chih, a member of the Central Committee, drops any threat of force against Taiwan, in a speech about Taiwan.

Mar. 3—In provincial radio broadcasts, Yao Wen-yuan, the country's leading polemicist, warns against "new bourgeois elements and upstarts" that endanger the Communist system and threaten to seize power. This is his first signed political statement in 7 years.

Mar. 9—The government issues a statement in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, the party's official newspaper, calling on the U.S. government to terminate immediately its support of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia.

### ECUADOR

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### ETHIOPIA

Mar. 4—The provisional military government nationalizes all rural land holdings; it imposes a 25-acre limit on private land ownership, forbids the employment of laborers, and, until the law goes into effect, guarantees landlord and tenant equal access to the land now under cultivation. Nearly 53 percent of the rural population functions under the tenant-farmer system.

Mar. 17—The U.S. State Department agrees to sell \$7 million worth of ammunition to the government, which requested \$30 million in munitions February 18.

Mar. 18—6 men are reported executed; they were sentenced to death last September for opposing the military's reforms. One of those executed, Tadesse Beru, was a former police general.

Mar. 21—The Military Council removes Asfa Wossen (deposed Emperor Haile Selassie's son) as crown prince and eliminates all titles of prince and princess.

### FRANCE

Mar. 16—Former Foreign Minister Michel Jobert announces the formation of a new political party, the Movement of Democrats. Emphasis on French nationalism and opposition to U.S. policy are main planks of the new party platform.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Mar. 2—Peter Lorenz's Christian Democratic party wins 43.9 percent of the votes in Berlin's mayoralty election, not enough votes to elect Lorenz mayor. Lorenz is still being held captive by kidnappers, who have demanded the release of 5 imprisoned radicals. The 5 radicals are flown to the Middle East in response to the kidnappers' demands.

Mar. 5—Lorenz is freed unhurt after being held for 6 days.

### INDIA

Mar. 4—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi unexpectedly ousts Minister of State for Works and Housing Mohan Dharia from his Cabinet position. Dharia has publicly urged

Gandhi to begin talks with Jaya Prakash Narayan, leader of the anticorruption movement, which is criticizing the Congress party.

Mar. 6—In New Delhi, 10,000 supporters of Narayan demonstrate against the government.

Mar. 20—An agreement is signed in Washington, D.C., in which the U.S. government agrees to supply India with 800,000 tons of wheat (to be delivered before June, 1975). The dollar value must be repaid over the next 40 years.

### IRAN

(See also *Intl, Persian Gulf Dispute; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 2—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi abolishes the 2-party system and establishes a one-party state for "at least the next 2 years." The new party, the National Resurrection party, will be headed by Premier Amir Abbas Hoveida.

Shah Pahlevi requests that 49 percent of all privately owned factories be sold to their workers or to the general public. The government will sell 99 percent of its factories, except in key industries, to its workers.

The Shah also announces a new national minimum monthly wage of \$84.

### IRAQ

(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Dispute*)

### ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 2—The government yields to labor demands by lowering the proposed payroll tax from 7.5 percent to 4 percent. Parliament must still approve the measure.

### ITALY

Mar. 8—The Chamber of Deputies gives final approval to a bill that lowers the voting age from 21 years to 18 years.

Mar. 21—The Interministerial Committee on Credit and Savings announces the end of the controversial prior deposit plan for importers imposed in May, 1974, and the easing of credit restrictions.

### JAPAN

Mar. 10—Former Premier Kakuei Tanaka is assessed \$140,300 for personal taxes for the last 3 years.

The Japan-China Oil Import Council announces that Japan has agreed to import \$600 million worth of oil from China, a doubling of any previous purchase.

### KENYA

Mar. 2—27 people are reported killed and 90 are injured when a bomb explodes on a crowded bus in Nairobi. This is the 3d bomb explosion in Nairobi in 2 weeks.

Mar. 11—Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, an outspoken critic of the Kenyatta government and a member of Parliament, is found shot to death outside Nairobi.

Mar. 19—A parliamentary committee begins an inquiry into the death of J. M. Kariuki.

### KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Mar. 12—Journalists on the country's largest daily newspaper, *Dong-A Ilbo*, take over the pressroom and printing facilities to protest the government's censorship of the press.

Mar. 17—Since no agreement has been reached between striking newsmen and the publisher, the publisher forcibly evicts them from his editorial and printing facilities; 5 journalists are reported injured.

Mar. 19—The National Assembly passes a bill that amends the criminal code by forbidding Koreans to criticize the government to foreigners.

### LEBANON

Mar. 2—Premier Rashid al-Solh announces a cease-fire in Saida after 2 days of fighting between army troops and gunmen calling themselves the "popular resistance."

### MALDIVES, REPUBLIC OF

Mar. 10—Presidential rule is declared by President Ibrahim Masir after he dismisses Premier Ahmed Zaki, according to *The New York Times*.

### MEXICO

Mar. 14—President Luis Echeverría Alvarez is met by angry students when he attempts to address an opening-day gathering at the National University in Mexico City. He and his bodyguards are showered with bottles and broken bricks.

### PORTUGAL

Mar. 11—An artillery barracks is attacked by 2 air force training planes in an attempted coup by right-wing officers against the military government.

Mar. 12—The 200-member Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement establishes a High Council of the Revolution, composed primarily of leftist officers, to take charge of the government, under Premier Vasco Santos Gonçalves.

The minister of information, Navy Commander Jorge Correreia Jusuino, reaffirms the government's promise to hold elections for the constituent assembly on April 12.

Former President António de Spínola flees by helicopter to Spain; although he is stripped of his rank he has not been accused officially of participating in the attempted coup of March 11.

Mar. 13—Army units are placed on full alert.

Civilian members of the Legislative Council of State resign. The newly formed High Council of the Revolution will assume legislative responsibilities.

Mar. 14—The High Council of the Revolution nationalizes the banking system. Since the majority of newspapers are owned by the banks, the new measure puts the press under government control as well. Premier Gonçalves declares that the government does not intend to nationalize the whole economy. The Council emphasizes the government's intention to honor all international commitments.

Mar. 15—The Brazilian foreign ministry grants territorial asylum to former President Spínola, his wife and 15 officers accompanying him.

The High Council of the Revolution nationalizes all of the country's 35 insurance companies, including those partly owned by foreign interests.

Mar. 16—All Cabinet members resign.

Mar. 18—The High Council of the Revolution bans the Christian Democratic party and 2 extreme left-wing groups from participating in the April 12 elections.

According to Brazilian press reports, General Spínola has denied taking part in the attempted military coup.

Mar. 19—The ruling Council postpones to April 25 the elections originally scheduled for April 12; "technical reasons" are cited.

Mar. 22—Jose Saldanha Sanches, leader of the recently banned Movement for the Reorganization of the Portuguese Proletariat, announces that his party will fight against the ban by "mobilizing the masses."

The executive committee of the Social Democratic

Center, the country's only legal conservative party, decides to present a new slate of candidates for the April 25 election. The Social Democrats have been under attack by leftists to withdraw from the election.

Mar. 23—In a televised news conference, Colonel Eurico Corvajo, chief of staff of the northern army headquarters, warns that a "highly dangerous" right-wing group known as the Portuguese Liberation Army, headquartered in Spain, is plotting against the government.

Mar. 25—A new Cabinet is formed in which the Communists have one additional minister and the Socialists and Popular Democrats retain 2 ministers each.

## Portuguese Territories

### ANGOLA

Mar. 28—At the end of night-long talks in Luanda, 3 liberation groups agree to end the fighting among themselves and to integrate their forces with the Portuguese force stationed in Angola; more than 60 people have been killed and 200 wounded in the last week of fighting.

### RHODESIA

Mar. 4—Talks break off between the government and the African National Congress following the arrest of black leader Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole for conspiring to assassinate rivals in the African National Congress.

Mar. 18—In Lusaka, Rhodesian black nationalist leader Herbert Chitepo and his aide are killed when a mine explodes under their automobile.

Mar. 20—In the wake of the killing of Chitepo, the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity calls on black nationalists to prepare for war against the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith.

Mar. 23—Following the murder of Herbert Chitepo, 50 members of the Rhodesian liberation movement (ZANU—Zimbabwe African National Union) are arrested in Zambia on order of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

### SAUDI ARABIA

Mar. 25—Riyadh radio in Saudi Arabia announces the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia by his nephew, Prince Faisal Ibn Musad Ibn Abdul Aziz; Crown Prince Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz is proclaimed king, succeeding his brother; another brother of King Faisal, Prince Fahd, becomes the new crown prince.

Mar. 29—King Khalid appoints a new Council of Ministers; Crown Prince Fahd is appointed first deputy premier. Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani will remain as minister of petroleum and mineral resources and Prince Saud Ibn Faisal will become secretary of state for foreign affairs.

Mar. 30—The government says Prince Faisal, the late king's assassin, was sane when he shot the king.

### SOMALIA

Mar. 23—French Ambassador Jean Gueury is kidnapped by 4 armed men, who demand the release of 2 Somali guerrilla prisoners held in France.

Mar. 25—The French government agrees to the demands made by the kidnappers of Ambassador Gueury. Italian Ambassador Giorgio Jacomelli begins negotiations with the guerrillas.

### SPAIN

Mar. 5—Premier Carlos Arias Navarro replaces 5 members of his Cabinet. This is the 2nd time since Navarro took office in 1974 that the Cabinet has been reshuffled.

## THAILAND

Mar. 3—The Cabinet of Premier Seni Pramroj says it plans to ask the U.S. to withdraw all its troops from Thailand within 18 months.

Mar. 6—The National Assembly votes 152 to 11 to oppose the Pramroj government; the Cabinet falls.

Mar. 13—The National Assembly elects Kukrit Pramroj, brother of Seni Pramroj, as Premier.

Mar. 17—Kukrit Pramroj says his government will ask for the withdrawal of all 25,000 U.S. troops and 350 U.S. aircraft from Thailand within a year.

Mar. 19—The National Assembly votes its confidence in Kukrit Pramroj's government, by a vote of 140 to 124.

Mar. 22—In Bangkok, it is reported that senior officials of the government will formally ask the U.S. to stop using Thailand as a base for its airlift of supplies to Phnom Penh.

## TURKEY

Mar. 13—After 9 days of negotiations, Premier Sadi Irmak says that he cannot form a coalition government. He will remain as caretaker Premier.

Mar. 19—Former Premier Suleyman Demirel says he will try to form a new government to put an end to the 6-month political crisis that has followed the resignation of Premier Bulent Ecevit. Demirel served as Premier from 1965 to 1971.

Mar. 31—President Fahri Koruturk approves a new conservative coalition Cabinet under Demirel. The coalition will ask the National Assembly for a vote of confidence next week.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *Hungary; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 19—A spokesman for the foreign ministry refuses to comment on the March 18 disclosure that the CIA (U.S.) attempted to recover a Soviet submarine. No mention has been made of the disclosure in the press, radio or television.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

Mar. 18—Prime Minister Harold Wilson tells the House of Commons that his Cabinet has decided to recommend to the electorate that it vote to remain in the European Economic Community. The referendum is scheduled for June, 1975.

### Northern Ireland

Mar. 25—Prime Minister Wilson sets May 1 as the date for new elections in Northern Ireland. Voters will elect 78 members for a constitutional convention that will draw up a plan for a power-sharing form of government.

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

Mar. 1—President Gerald Ford signs 2 bills providing financing for some of the nation's financially ailing railroads; one bill provides \$347 million in grants and loan guarantees for northeast and midwest rail lines, including operating funds for the Penn Central Railroad until January, 1976, when the Conrail system is to begin operation; the other bill provides an additional appropriation of \$143.1 million for fiscal 1975 for emergency aid to the railroads.

The Department of Agriculture reports that because of errors by the states in certification, food stamp recipients

received 23.2 percent more aid (\$160 million worth) than they were legally entitled to receive in the 6-month period ending June 30, 1974.

Mar. 4—President Ford vetoes the congressional oil import bill that would have delayed for 90 days the 3-stage oil-import tariff that began on February 1 with a levy of \$1 a barrel; additional levies of \$1 per barrel on March 1 and April 1 are scheduled. The President also announces that he will delay the final 2 stages of the tariff to encourage Congress to produce compromise legislation.

"Informed sources" report that CIA Director William E. Colby made an oral report to President Ford with regard to CIA plans for assassinating foreigners in addition to his 50-page written report on illegal CIA domestic spying operations.

The CIA discloses that it maintained a dossier on Representative Bella S. Abzug (D., N.Y.) for over 20 years and opened some of her mail and retained copies of the letters.

Mar. 5—President Ford tells Senator Frank Church (D., Id.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, that he hopes "to be as cooperative as possible" in the committee's investigation of U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies.

The White House press office states that President Ford will seek additional funding of \$412 million for 760,000 more summer jobs for young people in 1975 and \$1.625 billion to extend 310,000 public service jobs an additional 6 months.

Mar. 6—At a White House press conference, President Ford warns "that time is running out" and appeals to Congress for additional military aid to Cambodia.

Mar. 8—Retired FBI agent Arthur Murtagh, formerly of the Atlanta, Georgia, FBI office, says the FBI anonymously mailed some "unsavory" tape recordings resulting from "bugs" planted around Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., to his wife, Coretta King, in an attempt to silence King's criticism of the FBI.

Mar. 10—Carla A. Hill is sworn in as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; she is the first woman Cabinet member in 20 years.

The 21-member private Panel on International Information and Cultural Relations, meeting in Washington, D.C., recommends the abolition of the United States Information Agency and the transfer of its functions to the State Department.

Mar. 12—President Ford nominates federal district court Judge Harold B. Tyler as Deputy Attorney General.

Mar. 14—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requests President Ford to turn over records of White House authorization of all foreign and domestic intelligence activities covering the terms of the last 5 Presidents.

Mar. 15—A White House source reports that the Rockefeller commission investigating the CIA will also investigate allegations of CIA involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders.

Mar. 16—Spokesmen for the U.S. Customs Service and the Federal Energy Administration report that the agencies and the Department of Justice are investigating potential and alleged frauds in oil import pricing.

Mar. 17—Speaking at Notre Dame University in South Bend, Indiana, President Ford says that events in Southeast Asia tend to validate the so-called domino theory; he says that the continued existence of a non-Communist government in Cambodia is necessary for American security.

Speaking at a news conference, President Ford says that

he is "personally analyzing" charges that the CIA was involved in alleged assassination plots against foreign leaders.

Mar. 18—Documents released to federal district court in New York and to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence show that the FBI harassed the Socialist Workers party in various ways over a period of more than 10 years.

Unidentified government officials reveal that in 1974 the CIA financed the construction of a multimillion dollar deep-sea salvage vessel by a company owned by Howard Hughes in an effort to recover a Soviet nuclear submarine that sank in the Pacific Ocean after an explosion in 1968.

Mar. 19—Controller General Mortimer B. Staats asks Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton to "define clearly" the administration's policy on oil leasing on the outer continental shelf.

Mar. 24—A document prepared by the office of Management and Budget discloses administration projections that show that the U.S. budget deficit for fiscal 1976 may reach the \$100-billion level. President Ford's budget message only 2 months ago mentioned a \$51.9-billion deficit; Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon predicted an \$80-billion deficit last week.

Mar. 25—The Interstate Commerce Commission approves a 7 percent freight rates increase for most of the nation's railroads.

Mar. 27—White House press secretary Ron Nessen announces that President Ford will appoint Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton as secretary of commerce.

Mar. 31—The conditional amnesty offer for draft evaders and military evaders ends after 6 months. Only 22,500 of the 126,900 eligible for amnesty applied under the program.

### Civil Rights

Mar. 2—The Oregon Klamath Indians pledge to attempt to regain their status as a tribe. The federal government terminated this status in 1954.

Mar. 3—Members of the American Indian Movement end a week-long occupation of the Fairchild Camera and Instrument Company plant on the Navajo Reservation at Shiprock, N.M.

Mar. 12—Douglass Durham, chief security officer for the American Indian Movement during the trial of the leaders of the Wounded Knee take-over in the fall of 1974, says that at that time he was acting as a paid informer for the FBI.

Mar. 21—2 experts and 4 masters, appointed by Boston federal district court Judge W. Arthur Garrity, submit a city-wide desegregation plan for Boston's schools; the plan is to take effect next fall and requires less busing than the controversial and violence-wracked plan now in use to achieve desegregation.

### Economy

Mar. 6—The U.S. Labor Department reports that the government's wholesale price index declined by 0.3 percent in February; this is the third consecutive month the index has fallen.

Mar. 7—The Bureau of Labor Statistics releases figures showing that in February the nation's unemployment rate remained unchanged at 8.2 percent.

Mar. 8—The Federal Reserve Bank reduces its discount rate to commercial banks to 6.5 percent.

Mar. 10—The U.S. Department of Labor estimates that nearly 200,000 persons have been hired under the \$1-



billion public service employment program, which became law on December 31, 1974.

Mar. 14—The Federal Reserve Board reports that the nation's industrial output dropped 3 percent in February, compared to a 3.6 percent decline in January.

Mar. 19—The Commerce Department reports a record deficit of \$5.87 billion in the last quarter of 1974; the yearly deficit is reported at \$10.58 billion.

Mar. 21—The Labor Department reports a continued inflation in consumer prices; the consumer price index rose 0.6 percent in February.

The Commerce Department reports a 14.6-percent decline in corporate profits for the last quarter of 1974.

Mar. 27—The U.S. Commerce Department reports a United States balance-of-trade surplus for February, 1975, of \$917 million.

Mar. 31—The Agriculture Department reports a 2 percent fall in farm prices for the month ending March 31; this is the 5th consecutive monthly decline.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *India; U.S., Administration*)

Mar. 1—In a speech at Houston, Texas, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states that the U.S. is "prepared to move in a new direction" in U.S.-Cuban relations; this decision could mean the end of 14 years of boycott against Cuba by the 23-member Organization of American States.

Mar. 3—After conferring with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a State Department official reports that Kissinger believes there is little use in any new major diplomatic efforts to settle the Cambodian and South Vietnamese conflicts.

Mar. 4—At a joint news conference in Washington, D.C., a U.S. State Department representative and Iranian Finance Minister Hushang Ansary announce that Iran will spend \$15 billion on American goods and services in the next 5 years. Iran will spend \$7 billion more for 8 nuclear power plants during the next 10 years.

Mar. 7—The Bank of America, because of restrictions on loans to the U.S.S.R. by the Export-Import Bank, offers to lend \$500 million to the U.S.S.R. to finance U.S. imports going to Russia.

Kissinger arrives in Egypt to negotiate with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat over terms to be offered Israel in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai.

Mar. 8—Sources in the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh report that Ambassador Gunther Dean proposed to Kissinger in April, 1974, that an attempt be made to contact key Cambodian rebels to negotiate possible peace terms. Kissinger rejected the proposal.

The American Tunaboat Association appeals to President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger for naval escorts to protect the American tuna fleet from Ecuadorian gunboats; it also asks for economic sanctions against Ecuador.

Mar. 10—Kissinger flies to Ankara, Turkey, for talks with Turkish leaders with regard to the Cyprus situation.

In a televised interview, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger says that North Vietnamese forces have "dramatically" increased their infiltration of South Vietnam in recent weeks; Schlesinger expects a major North Vietnamese offensive before the 1976 U.S. presidential election.

In an apparent break with President Ford, Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) tells a Washington, D.C., news conference that the U.S. should pressure Cambodia into a transition government that would be able to negotiate

with the Cambodian rebels about a truce and the safety of refugees.

Mar. 16—Israeli President Ephraim Katzir ends a 13-day visit to U.S. and returns to Israel.

Mar. 23—Secretary of State Kissinger returns to Washington, D.C., after his 18-day peace-making mission to the Middle East; Kissinger is convinced that his step-by-step approach to peace in the Middle East has failed.

Mar. 24—State Department spokesman Robert Anderson reports that President Ford today ordered a policy review of U.S. relations in all "aspects and all countries" in the Middle East, after the failure of Kissinger's efforts to secure a détente between Israel and Egypt.

Mar. 26—General Frederick C. Weyand, the army chief of staff, leaves for Saigon to evaluate the military situation and report to President Ford on the need for more U.S. aid to Saigon.

Mar. 27—In an interview made public today, President Ford says that, "if [Israel] had been a bit more flexible . . . I think in the longer run it would have been the best insurance for peace."

Mar. 29—The President announces that U.S. naval ships and contract ships have been directed to aid in evacuating refugees from coastal ports in South Vietnam.

## Labor and Industry

Mar. 9—*The New York Times* reports that work has finally started on the Alaska pipeline, which will carry oil from the Prudhoe Bay oil fields to the ice-free port of Valdez; the cost of the project, delayed for 6 years by controversy, litigation and the need for planning, is estimated at \$6 billion.

Mar. 21—The Ford Motor Company says that all 69 of its manufacturing and assembly plants will be in operation by next week, although 28,475 workers will remain on indefinite furlough; the auto industry has placed 212,390 workers on an indefinite layoff.

## Legislation

(See also *Administration*)

Mar. 7—The Senate votes to change rule 22 (its filibuster rule) so that only 60 senatorial votes (3/5) will be required to end a filibuster instead of the 67 needed at present; the amended rule provides, nonetheless, that 67 votes, 2/3 of the votes of those present and voting, are still necessary to invoke closure in debate on any future changes in the Senate's rules.

Mar. 11—The House votes an operating funds appropriation of \$10 million for 10 of its committees; this is a 79 percent increase over 1974.

Mar. 12—Voting 84 to 13, the Senate passes a strip mining regulation bill almost identical with the bill vetoed by President Ford in December, 1974.

Mar. 26—Congress passes a tax-reduction bill providing for a \$22.8 billion net tax reduction in 1975; \$24.8 billion in tax reduction is offset by a \$2-billion increase in business taxes. A tax rebate of \$100 to \$200 per family on 1974 taxes and a small negative income tax is provided. Partial repeal of the oil and gas depletion allowance is also included. The bill goes to the White House. In January, President Ford urged a tax-reduction bill of \$16.2 billion.

Mar. 29—President Ford signs the tax reduction bill although he has expressed serious reservations about the \$60-billion deficit it creates.

**Political Scandal**

Mar. 10—At the request of Watergate special prosecutor Henry S. Ruth, Jr., U.S. district court Judge John J. Sirica dismisses charges against Gordon C. Strachan for his part in the Watergate cover-up. Strachan was an aide to H. R. Haldeman, White House chief of staff in the Nixon administration.

Mar. 11—The Securities and Exchange Commission charges the Gulf Oil Corporation with concealing a \$10-million secret fund by falsifying its reports; the fund was to be used for illegal political contributions.

Mar. 12—Former Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans pleads guilty in federal court in Washington, D.C., to 5 misdemeanor counts of violating campaign financing laws while director of former President Richard Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. Stans is the 3d member of Nixon's Cabinet either to plead guilty or to be found guilty by jury verdict.

Mar. 14—U.S. district court Judge John J. Sirica sentences Frederick C. LaRue, a 1972 campaign aide to Nixon, to 6 months in prison for his part in the Watergate cover-up; LaRue was a key prosecution witness in the Watergate cover-up trial.

**Politics**

Mar. 7—At a Republican leadership conference in Washington, D.C., President Gerald Ford says: "I can tell you without equivocation . . . that I fully intend to seek the nomination of the Republican party as its candidate for President in 1976."

Mar. 8—At the closing session of the Republican leadership conference, former California Governor Ronald Reagan says: "A political party cannot be all things to all people"; he urges the party to hold to its conservative image.

**Supreme Court**

Mar. 3—The Supreme Court rules 8 to 1 that a Georgia state law making it a misdemeanor to print or broadcast the name of a rape victim (information available from public law enforcement records) is invalid; newspapers, radio and television stations cannot be subject to criminal prosecution or civil damage suits for invasion of privacy in a case of this kind.

Mar. 17—The Supreme Court rules unanimously that the federal government holds exclusive rights to oil and natural gas resources on the outer Atlantic continental shelf beyond the 3-mile limit. In the case in question, 13 Atlantic states contended that by royal charter they retained rights to seabed resources out to 100 miles.

Mar. 18—By a 5 to 4 vote on a case originating in Chattanooga, Tennessee, the Supreme Court rules that theatrical productions enjoy the same constitutional protection against advance censorship as newspapers, books and movies.

Mar. 19—The Supreme Court rules unanimously that the 36-year-old Social Security provision that authorizes survivor's benefits to widows with children but not to widowers is unconstitutional.

**VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)**

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Mar. 25—President Nguyen Van Thieu asks Premier Tran Thien Khiem to form a new Cabinet, citing the need for stronger resistance to the Communist offensive.

**ZAMBIA**

(See *Rhodesia*)

**ETHIOPIA**

(Continued from page 231)

resumed following the visit of General Aman, a former military attaché in Washington willing to compromise on the Eritrean issue, at a time when Kenya and Ethiopia shared a growing concern over Somali acquisition of sophisticated Soviet weapons systems (Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny had visited Somalia and promised even more arms, and United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly overruled advice from his own department and the Pentagon). American aid was later halted, or "delayed," according to Washington, after the assassination of Ethiopian military and political leaders in November, 1974. The aid suspension coincided with widespread African condemnation of the Ethiopian military junta. Shipments were finally resumed after the Eritrean offensive; instead of over the \$100 million requested, Washington approved only about \$25 million.

There was also the painful but real question of the consequences of "abandoning" a country when it was faced with serious internal rebellion openly supported by other nations in view of the fact that for over 25 years it had remained almost exclusively dependent on American aid. Peking had offered \$80 million worth of heavy weapons, and Ethiopia could also solicit Russian help.

The implications of total American inaction are not easily measurable, but could be detrimental to United States interests and prestige abroad. An Ethiopian realignment toward Moscow or Peking would go far to insure Red Sea domination by potentially antagonistic forces, and the warm feeling that the United States is no longer mindlessly "fighting the cold war" does nothing to maintain some American influence in the area. American strategic interests in Ethiopia are largely derivative—preempting influence by major powers whose interests do not coincide with those of the United States. Ethiopia herself is no longer of any great strategic importance for the United States. But if the issue of United States aid is viewed in the context of continued access to oil, of southern Israel's only outlet to the sea, and of developments in the Indian Ocean, it takes on a somewhat different coloration. As is frequently the case in foreign policy, no one could guarantee results. Recent American policy toward Ethiopia, given its confused circumstances and possible far-reaching implications, has therefore steered a prudent, if at times desultory, middle course. ■

ERRATUM: We regret that Manuel B. Garcia Alvarez was incorrectly identified in our March, 1975, issue, on page 117. He was in charge of the Constitutional Law Department at the University of Oviedo only until September, 1974.

Atlantic  
Ocean

U. S. S. R.

Black Sea


Caspian Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Red Sea

Indian Ocean

# Nations of Africa



Cape Town  
CAPE OF  
GOOD HOPE

Lang.

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